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STRIKING A BALANCE: PRIVACY AND NATIONAL
SECURITY IN SECTION 702 U.S. PERSON QUERIES
Brittany Adams*
Abstract: The transformation of U.S. foreign intelligence in recent years has led to
increasing privacy concerns. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)
traditionally regulated foreign intelligence surveillance by authorizing warrant-based searches
of U.S. and non-U.S. persons. Individualized court orders under traditional FISA were intended
to protect U.S. persons and limit the scope of intelligence collection. In a post-9/11 world,
however, the intelligence community cited concerns regarding the speed and efficiency of
collection under traditional methods. The intelligence and law enforcement communities
recognized the “wall” preventing information sharing between the communities as a central
failure leading to the 9/11 attacks. In response, the scope and authorizations of foreign
intelligence collection were expanded with numerous statutory measures, culminating in the
passage of Section 702. Under Section 702, only non-U.S. persons located abroad may be
surveillance targets, but no warrant is required for the intelligence collection. Since its passage,
the intelligence community and privacy advocates have intensely debated the implications of
incidental collection of U.S. person communications, including the use of U.S. person queries.
Despite the significant expansion of surveillance authorized in the shift from traditional FISA
to Section 702, minimization and targeting procedures regulated by the new statute are
designed to protect U.S. persons and balance national security and privacy interests.
This Comment addresses the uncomfortable question of whether the U.S. Constitution
permits the minor intrusion of a few to protect national security and argues that Section 702
queries are searches under the Fourth Amendment that require a justification independent from
the overall surveillance to be constitutional. Nonetheless, the Fourth Amendment protects
against only unreasonable searches or seizures by the government, and U.S. person queries are
reasonable searches characterized by critical foreign intelligence interests and robust
safeguards that outweigh limited impacts on privacy. While the Fourth Amendment does
require probable cause warrants for U.S. person queries conducted for criminal investigative
purposes, such queries are rare. Striking the proper balance between privacy and security,
particularly in the modern technological era, is a complex and challenging legal question. In
this context, considerations must include policy and value-laden choices that weigh the
statute’s own regulatory measures against the rights protected by the Fourth Amendment. Such
an approach renders U.S. person queries reasonable Fourth Amendment searches, albeit
subject to more stringent requirements than courts and the government have previously found.

* J.D. Candidate, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2019. Special thanks to David
Kris for his guidance on the topic and invaluable insights on earlier drafts of this Comment. I would
also like to thank the staff of Washington Law Review for their thoughtful suggestions and editorial
work.
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INTRODUCTION
After the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the Intelligence
Community (IC) urged Congress to grant it broader authority for
surveillance of foreign persons.1 Congress’s responsive efforts led to the
passage of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978
Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA).2 Section 7023 is a provision of the FAA
that permits the government to collect intelligence on non-U.S. persons4
located abroad by conducting targeted surveillance.5 The government—
namely the National Security Agency (NSA), the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)—uses the
intelligence collected under Section 702 to “protect the United States and
its allies from hostile foreign adversaries, including terrorists, [weapons]
proliferators, and spies, and to inform cybersecurity efforts.”6 Section 702
intelligence has been used to prevent attacks on U.S. Armed Forces
abroad, thwart weapons proliferation in the Middle East, prevent
cybersecurity attacks on U.S. infrastructure, and recruit CIA assets.7
Accordingly, officials in the IC have stated that Section 702 is “one of the
most valuable tools that we have in our toolbox to keep America safe.”8

1. See, e.g., NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 78–80, 273–76 (2004) (discussing legal constraints and barriers preventing adequate
counterterrorism responses within the intelligence community pre-9/11); Administration Defends
NSA
Eavesdropping
to
Congress,
CNN
(Dec.
23,
2005,
10:51
AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/12/23/justice.nsa/index.html [https://perma.cc/CX74-BFN9]
(discussing a Justice Department letter to Congress explaining that FISA lacks the “speed and agility”
necessary to detect and prevent threats).
2. FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 50 U.S.C.).
3. Id. § 702 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2018)).
4. As defined in the statute, U.S. persons include U.S. citizens, U.S. permanent residents, groups
substantially composed of U.S. citizens or permanent residents, and U.S. corporations. 50 U.S.C.
§ 1801(i). Non-U.S. persons are those persons who fall outside the statutorily enumerated categories
of U.S. persons, including corporations or associations that are foreign powers. Id. § 1801(a)(1)–(3).
5. See FISA Amendments Act § 702.
6. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, SECTION 702 OVERVIEW,
https://www.dni.gov/files/icotr/Section702-Basics-Infographic.pdf [https://perma.cc/YB58-42A3].
7. See PRIVACY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM
OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 108 (2014)
[hereinafter PCLOB REPORT], https://www.pclob.gov/library/702-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5Z7D3BU] (discussing the use of Section 702 collected intelligence to protect national security, including
the prevention of an attack on U.S. soil by a U.S. citizen connected to al-Qaeda).
8. Christopher Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Remarks at The Heritage Foundation: Defending
the Value of FISA Section 702 (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/defending-the-valueof-fisa-section-702 [https://perma.cc/44XN-Q4ZV].

13 - Adams.docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

3/25/2019 8:40 PM

U.S. PERSON QUERIES

403

Notwithstanding these advantages, privacy and civil liberty advocates
have raised concerns that Section 702 does not adequately protect U.S.
persons’ privacy.9 Particularly, privacy advocates have challenged the use
of terms identifying U.S. persons to “query,” or search, the databases of
Section 702 collected information.10 Querying raises Fourth Amendment
concerns over governmental access to U.S. person information
incidentally collected during authorized surveillance on non-U.S.
persons.11 Even though U.S. persons cannot be targets of Section 702
surveillance, U.S. persons’ communications may be swept up in the
process.12 Because U.S. person information may be incidentally yet
lawfully collected in Section 702 surveillance, database queries may yield
U.S. person communications.13
Privacy advocates have recommended imposing probable cause
warrant requirements on such queries.14 Currently, queries must be
conducted to return foreign intelligence information15 or evidence of a

9. E.g., Q & A: US Warrantless Surveillance Under Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 14, 2017, 1:54 PM), https://www.hrw.org/
news/2017/09/14/q-us-warrantless-surveillance-under-section-702-foreign-intelligence-surveillance
[https://perma.cc/TC9B-Z64S] (discussing how Section 702 “violates the human right to privacy” and
is inconsistent with basic human rights law); Derek Hawkins, The Cybersecurity 202: Privacy
Advocates Are Back in Court Fighting NSA Surveillance. It’s an Uphill Battle., WASH. POST:
POWERPOST (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/powerpost/paloma/thecybersecurity-202/2018/09/04/the-cybersecurity-202-privacy-advocates-are-back-in-court-fightingnsa-surveillance-it-s-an-uphill-battle/5b8d69f21b326b3f31919f29/?noredirect=on
[https://perma.cc/U4WM-KWK6] (explaining the ongoing legal challenges to Section 702
surveillance brought by U.S. privacy groups).
10. See Letter from Forty-Seven Organizations to Bob Goodlatte, Chairman, and John Conyers,
Ranking
Member,
U.S.
House
of
Representatives
(Oct.
13,
2017),
https://www.fcnl.org/documents/465 [https://perma.cc/F32T-9YL5] (urging Congress to reform
Section 702 and addressing concerns over querying).
11. Id. (discussing the use of U.S. person queries as an “exception” to the warrant requirement that
threatens the privacy rights of “innocent Americans”).
12. See infra Section I.B.2.b. for a discussion of incidental collection of U.S. person communications.
13. See NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT
TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED 4–5, 9–
12 (2017) [hereinafter NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES].
14. See USA Liberty Act of 2017, H.R. 3989, 115th Cong. (2017). This proposed bill would have
required the government to obtain a probable cause order before querying Section 702 databases to
retrieve content data. Id.
15. Foreign intelligence information is defined in 50 U.S.C. § 1801(e)(1) (2018) as “information
that relates to, and if concerning a United States person is necessary to, the ability of the United States
to protect against” potential or actual attacks or clandestine intelligence activities by foreign powers
or their agents, weapons of mass destruction proliferation by foreign powers or their agents, sabotage,
and international terrorism. It also includes information with respect to foreign powers, territories, or

13 - Adams.docx (Do Not Delete)

404

3/25/2019 8:40 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:401

crime, but no court order requirement exists for most searches.16
Accordingly, privacy advocates are concerned that U.S. person queries
evade the Fourth Amendment by allowing the government access to U.S.
person communications that would otherwise require a warrant, earning
the queries the title “backdoor searches.”17 In part, the concern arises from
the FBI’s ability to query data for criminal investigations, blurring the line
between national security and domestic law enforcement.18 While the
most recent reauthorization imposes a court order requirement on the FBI
in certain circumstances, the requirement does not go far enough to fully
address privacy concerns.19
The IC suggests that a warrant requirement would hamper the speed
and efficiency of surveillance operations and run counter to national
security by delaying or potentially prohibiting access to intelligence
identifying impending threats.20 Additionally, queries do not result in any
new intelligence collection but allow access only to communications that
have already been collected lawfully under Section 702 surveillance
procedures subject to significant internal and external oversight.21 The
FBI has responded that it is “extremely unlikely that an agent or analyst
who is conducting an assessment of a non-national security crime would
get a responsive result from the query against the Section 702-acquired
data.”22 Nonetheless, the Fourth Amendment implications of U.S. person
queries merit a focused analysis.
This Comment argues that querying is a separate search for Fourth
Amendment purposes and is thus subject to Fourth Amendment
agents thereof, that is related to the “national defense or the security of the United States” or “the
conduct of the foreign affairs of the United States.” Id. § 1801(e)(2).
16. See FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE FED.
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF
1978, AS AMENDED 19 (2016) [hereinafter FBI MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES]; NSA MINIMIZATION
PROCEDURES, supra note 13, at 4–5.
17. E.g., Backdoor Search, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/pages/backdoorsearch [https://perma.cc/MML5-BUD9] (noting that “the civil liberties community” refers to queries
as the “‘backdoor search’ loophole in Section 702” surveillance).
18. Id. (noting concern that, under Section 702, “domestic law enforcement officials can, without
a warrant, access Americans’ communications that they would otherwise need a warrant to access”).
19. FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-118, § 101, 132 Stat. 3, 4–5 (2018).
20. See David S. Kris, Modernizing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 5–6 (2007)
(Brookings Inst., Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr. & Hoover Inst., Working Paper),
https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/1115_nationalsecurity_kris.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R4V3-LLMR] (discussing the government’s concern with the restrictions imposed
by the inefficiencies of the traditional FISA framework).
21. Wray, supra note 8 (explaining that the government is performing queries of information it has
“already lawfully obtained”).
22. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 8, 59–60.
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reasonableness standards. However, given (1) the minimization
procedures in place to protect the acquisition, retention, use, and
dissemination of U.S. person information; (2) the statutorily required
oversight; and (3) the foreign intelligence purpose of the surveillance, the
queries are nonetheless reasonable. With some delineation between
queries conducted for foreign intelligence purposes versus criminal
investigative purposes, privacy rights may be adequately balanced with
the government’s compelling interests in national security and foreign
intelligence.
Part I provides an overview of Section 702 surveillance procedures. In
particular, Part I explains how the government collects intelligence under
the statute and the procedures designed to limit intrusions on U.S.
persons’ privacy. Part II describes relevant Fourth Amendment law,
including how courts define searches and seizures and interpret the
reasonableness of Fourth Amendment searches in the context of modern
technology. Part III concludes that U.S. person queries are constitutional
Fourth Amendment searches. Generally, a warrant should not be required
to conduct queries using U.S. person identifiers. Notwithstanding an
exception for U.S. person queries performed for criminal investigations,
minimization procedures and statutorily required oversight make
reasonable an otherwise intrusive search.
I.

POLITICAL AND STATUTORY FOUNDATIONS FOR
SECTION 702 SURVEILLANCE

In 2008, Congress amended the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
of 1978 (FISA) with the passage of the FAA. Congress included a new
provision in the FAA, known as Section 702.23 Section 702 authorizes the
IC to collect the electronic communications of targeted non-U.S. persons
located outside the United States for foreign intelligence purposes.24
Section 702 is a complex surveillance program involving the collection of
multiple types of communications, obtained through numerous methods,
for multiple purposes by multiple intelligence agencies. While
Section 702 does not permit the IC to target U.S. persons in or outside of
the United States, it does permit the incidental collection of U.S. persons’
communications.25 Such incidental collection is subject to procedural
rules governing the use, retention, and dissemination of those

23. FISA Amendments Act § 702 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2018)).
24. See id.
25. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 6–9.
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communications.26 Each intelligence agency has its own rules governing
the handling and use of the acquired data.27 This Part provides context for
the concerns surrounding querying Section 702 data, including: (1) the
transition from “traditional FISA” to Section 702, (2) the operation of
intelligence collection authorized under the statute, and (3) the
development of Fourth Amendment law pertinent to electronic
surveillance.
A.

The Surveillance Expansion in the Transition from “Traditional
FISA” to Section 702

FISA was originally enacted in 1978 to establish a court-sanctioned
process allowing the U.S. Attorney General (AG) to conduct electronic
surveillance on both U.S. and non-U.S. persons for foreign intelligence
purposes.28 This Act—now known as “traditional FISA”—required an
individualized court order for each specific target the government
intended to surveil.29 Over time, Congress expanded the government’s
authority to conduct foreign intelligence surveillance within the FISA
framework.30 Perhaps the most notable addition is Section 702.
Section 702 has its roots in the surveillance program authorized by
President Bush in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.31 In response to the
attacks, the intelligence and law enforcement communities acknowledged
their limitations in failing to prevent 9/11.32 Importantly, they recognized
the existence of the “wall” between the two communities preventing
information sharing.33 To facilitate better homeland security and allow the
government to “connect the dots,” the pre-9/11 wall was removed, in part,

26. Id.
27. Id. at 2, 86.
28. Id. at 80; OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, THE FISA AMENDMENTS ACT: Q&A
1–2 (2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/icotr/FISA%20Amendments%20Act%20QA%20for%20
Publication.pdf [https://perma.cc/U737-525P].
29. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 80; see Laura K. Donohue, Section 702 and the Collection of
International Telephone and Internet Content, 38 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 117, 136, 154 (2015).
30. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 80.
31. Id. at 5.
32. See generally RICHARD A. BEST, JR., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY AND 9/11: CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS AND THE STATUS OF THE INVESTIGATION
(2003), https://fas.org/irp/crs/RL31650.pdf [https://perma.cc/A9EV-R7VP] (explaining the
congressional hearings and public testimony regarding the IC and law enforcement responses to 9/11).
33. Id. at 8–9 (noting that a former inspector general of the Defense Department and other IC and
law enforcement officials described the “walls derived from the provisions of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act” as “unworkable and counterproductive set of bureaucratic hurdles”).
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with the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP).34 TSP permitted the
government to intercept contents of international communications outside
of the traditional FISA process when the government believed that at least
one party to a communication was a member of al-Qaeda or was
supporting a related terrorist organization.35 The Bush Administration
cited FISA’s lack of flexibility in identifying potential terrorist threats as
justification for the new program.36
Under traditional FISA, acquisition of stored email from a U.S.
provider’s server within the country is considered “electronic
surveillance.”37 As such, FISA’s warrant requirement extended to nonU.S. persons having no connection to the United States except opening an
email account with a U.S. provider. Thus, FISA’s warrant requirement
may have protected foreigners outside the United States who were
considered potential threats. According to the Bush Administration, such
a requirement inhibited the “speed and agility required” for early
identification of potential terrorist threats.38
After information about TSP became public and the Administration
faced increasing pressure regarding the legality of the program, the
government sought and obtained authorization from the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)39 to transfer TSP collection to the
34. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITIES SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE NATIONAL
SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT 1–3, 10–13 (2006) [hereinafter LEGAL
AUTHORITIES NSA] (situating the executive’s legal authority for TSP within the commander-inchief’s Article II powers and the Authorization for the Use of Military Force (AUMF)).
35. Id.; see OFFICES OF THE INSPECTORS GEN. OF THE DEP’T OF DEF., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CENT.
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY & OFF. OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE,
UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON THE PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, REPORT NO. 2009-0013-A
(2009), https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0907.pdf [https://perma.cc/VV6B-WGXB]; Press Release,
Press Briefing by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales and General Michael Hayden, Principal Deputy
Director
for
National
Intelligence
(Dec.
19,
2005),
https://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051219-1.html [https://perma.cc/8HNJ-4ERK].
36. Donohue, supra note 29, at 127. The Administration also initially claimed that TSP was fully
consistent with FISA—primarily to avoid any difficult constitutional questions regarding FISA that
would arise if the TSP violated the statute (namely whether traditional FISA unconstitutionally limits
the president’s Article II powers). LEGAL AUTHORITIES NSA, supra note 34, at 2–3.
37. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(4) (2018).
38. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR THE RECENTLY DISCLOSED NSA ACTIVITIES
3, https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2007/01/11/surveillance11.pdf [https://perm
a.cc/KC72-AFPR].
39. The FISC was established by traditional FISA and is composed of eleven federal district court
judges sitting in a secure courtroom in a federal courthouse in Washington, D.C. About the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court, U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE CT.,
http://www.fisc.uscourts.gov/about-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-court [https://perma.cc/A8HRMFVQ]. The FISC reviews U.S. government applications for “approval of electronic surveillance,
physical search, and other investigative actions for foreign intelligence purposes” and most hearings
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FISA framework.40 In January 2007, the FISC authorized the government
to conduct electronic surveillance of telephone and internet
communications into and out of the United States under FISA when:
(1) the government had probable cause to believe that at least one of the
communicants was a member or agent of al-Qaeda or an affiliated terrorist
organization, and (2) the government reasonably believed at least one of
those communicants was located outside the United States.41 In May
2007, when the government sought renewal of the program, the FISC
reauthorized the surveillance but modified the program to require the
court, as opposed to the government, to make probable cause
determinations regarding the foreign targets.42 In requiring court approval
of individual targets, the FISC effectively rejected the key innovation of
the Administration’s surveillance program—i.e., the enhanced “speed and
agility” permitted by requiring only executive-branch approvals.43
Separate from TSP collection, a second intelligence collection effort
was underway within the traditional FISA framework.44 This effort
required individualized court orders to compel private communications
companies to assist the government in collecting the communications of
targeted persons located outside the United States.45 Noting concerns with
and opinions issued by the court are classified. Id. For more information, see David Kris, How the
FISA Court Really Works, LAWFARE (Sept. 2, 2018, 5:29 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/howfisa-court-really-works [https://perma.cc/96VL-GBYJ].
40. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
16,
2005),
https://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy-on-callers-withoutcourts.html [https://perma.cc/KQ6A-KGHR]. The New York Times disclosed TSP to the public after
delaying publication for one year because the Bush administration cited concerns that disclosure
would threaten national security. Id.; see PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 5; Donohue, supra note
29, at 8; Leslie Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY (May
11, 2006, 10:38 AM), https://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm
(last visited Jan. 28, 2019); Josh Meyer & Joseph Menn, U.S. Spying Is Much Wider, Some Suspect,
L.A. TIMES (Dec.
25,
2005),
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/dec/25/nation/na-spy25
[https://perma.cc/TMP2-8TZR] (discussing TSP’s broad intelligence collection authority and the
potential threat to individual privacy).
41. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at 1–2, ACLU v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 552 U.S. 1179
(2008) (No. 07-648) (mem.) denying cert. from 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007); Classified Certification
of the Attorney General of the United States at ¶ 37, In re Nat’l Sec. Agency Telecomms. Records
Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 949 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (MDL Dkt. No. 06-1791-VRW).
42. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 7, 116.
43. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition, supra note 41, at 2; Eric Lichtblau, James Risen, and
Mark Mazzetti, Reported Drop in Surveillance Spurred a Law, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 11, 2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/11/washington/11nsa.html
[https://perma.cc/BKE9-M6FW]
(discussing interactions with Congressional officials on FISA requirements, including a reported
“intelligence gap”).
44. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 18.
45. See id.
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both programs, the government stated that it and the FISC were expending
“considerable resources” to obtain probable cause court orders.46 As a
result, the acquisition of foreign intelligence necessary to further U.S.
national security interests was often delayed or prohibited.47
Accordingly, in April 2007, the Bush Administration submitted a
proposal to Congress to modify FISA.48 In response, Congress passed the
Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA)49—the precursor to Section 702. The
PAA combined the authority for both TSP and the separate collection
effort involving individualized FISC orders into a single legislative
authorization.50 When the PAA expired in February 2008, Congress
replaced it with Section 702 of the FAA.51 Congress most recently
reauthorized Section 702 in January 2018.52
Section 702 was widely debated both at its initial passage in 2008 and
during its reauthorization in 2018.53 Section 702 differs in significant
ways from traditional FISA. Fundamentally, Section 702 is a large-scale
foreign intelligence surveillance program while traditional FISA is a
targeted surveillance program. Unlike traditional FISA, Section 702 does
not require individualized court orders because it does not permit targeting
of U.S. persons.54 Nonetheless, traditional FISA’s protections reduce the
likelihood of improper surveillance and collection of U.S. person
communications.55 Additionally, Section 702 eliminates the requirements
imposed by traditional FISA that surveillance targets be foreign powers

46. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
110th Cong. 5 (2008) (Statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein, Assistant Attorney General, National
Security Division, Department of Justice).
47. See id. at 5–6, 18.
48. See S. Rep. No. 110-209, at 2, 5 (2007); Donohue, supra note 29, at 13.
49. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552.
50. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 19.
51. See id.
52. FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-118, § 101, 132 Stat. 3, 4–5 (2018).
53. See, e.g., Senate Debate on FISA Reauthorization, 115th Cong. (Jan. 16, 2018), https://www.cspan.org/video/?439676-3/senate-debate-fisa-reauthorization
[https://perma.cc/87YU-H9NR]
(footage of the Senate debate over FISA reauthorization, expressing concerns over the use of
Section 702 in domestic surveillance); Press Release, Senator Mike Lee, Sens. Lee, Leahy Release
Joint Statement on Upcoming Debate on Section 702 Legislation (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/1/sens-lee-leahy-joint-statement-on-housepassage-of-fisa-reauthorization [https://perma.cc/P32N-MNFV] (calling for alternatives to
Section 702 noting that the reauthorization bill “falls short in providing critical protections for
Americans”).
54. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2018).
55. Id.
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or agents of foreign powers.56 Compared to Section 702, traditional
FISA’s protections limit the scope and amount of communications
collected.57 However, traditional FISA required significant legal
protection—even for targets with no connection to the United States—and
technological advances made it difficult to administer.58 Conversely,
Section 702 reduces these protections and does not require the same level
of authorizations.59
Under Section 702, the range of people whom the government may
target is much broader than traditional FISA.60 Section 702 surveillance is
not limited to foreign powers and agents of a foreign power but extends
to any foreign person located abroad who is “reasonably believed” to
communicate specified kinds of foreign intelligence information.61 That
person, however, need not be engaging in any international terrorism or
criminal activity—it is enough that the government believes a person may
possess information about such activity.62 By way of comparison,
approximately 129,080 targets were surveilled under Section 702 in 2017
while significantly less—1,337—were surveilled under traditional FISA
in the same year.63 Even so, Section 702 collection is anything but
unrestricted—targeting and minimization procedures, and many layers of
internal and external oversight, govern the program for statutory and
constitutional compliance. Nonetheless, the increased scope and
expansive collection authorized under Section 702 combined with
technological advances allowing the acquisition and retention of vast

56. Id. § 1804(a)(3); id. § 1801(b)(2)(A)–(E) (defining agents of foreign power to include any
person who, on behalf of a foreign power, “knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering
activities” that “involve or may involve” criminal conduct, “sabotage or international terrorism,”
entering the U.S. under “under a false or fraudulent identity,” or aiding and abetting any of the
aforementioned).
57. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 115–16.
58. David S. Kris, Trends and Predictions in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance: The FAA and
Beyond, 3 (Hoover Inst. Working Grp. on Nat’l Sec., Tech., & Law, Paper No. 1601, 2016),
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/kris_trendspredictions_final_v4_digital.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6VV8-NKZ8] (“In particular, the rise of web-based e-mail and other developments
made it more difficult to determine the location of parties to an intercepted communication” and
traditional FISA is “dependent on knowledge of those locations”).
59. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a.
60. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 115.
61. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a.
62. See id.; PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 115.
63. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATISTICAL TRANSPARENCY REPORT
REGARDING USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES: CALENDAR YEAR 2017, at 8, 14 (2018),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/icotr/2018-ASTR——CY2017——FINAL-for-Release5.4.18.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SBV-FBRZ].

13 - Adams.docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

3/25/2019 8:40 PM

U.S. PERSON QUERIES

411

amounts of data raise important Fourth Amendment concerns for U.S.
person communications swept up in the process.64 These shifts are critical
to the constitutionality analysis of U.S. person queries.
B.

How Section 702 Collection and Surveillance Works

To understand the concerns over database queries, one must understand
fundamentally how Section 702 collection functions. Section 702 permits
the government to target “persons reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information.”65 A
person may be targeted for collection if the person is likely to possess,
receive, or communicate foreign intelligence.66 Broadly speaking,
Section 702 permits the AG and the Director of National Intelligence
(DNI) to compel the assistance of U.S.-based electronic communication
service providers (ECSPs) to acquire a variety of communications for
foreign intelligence purposes.67
Section 702 collection is subject to considerable oversight and
regulation.68 While multiple intelligence agencies have authority under
Section 702, this Comment focuses specifically on the differences
between NSA and FBI procedures to elucidate the relevant privacy
concerns.69 The following sections explain the procedures used to collect
and protect data under Section 702.

64. See generally PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7 (reviewing and analyzing Section 702 for statutory
and constitutional compliance, paying particular attention to Fourth Amendment privacy concerns
and making policy recommendations to mitigate privacy intrusions in the context of querying).
65. Procedures for Targeting Certain Persons Outside the United States Other than United States
Persons, FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 101, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438 (codified
at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a); see OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, supra note 28, at 9.
66. See PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 22. For the statutory definition of foreign intelligence,
see supra note 15.
67. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 20. Under traditional FISA, court orders were required to
compel providers to assist the government in acquisition and collection, but under Section 702, the
AG and DNI have authority to issue directives to ECSPs requiring their assistance. 50 U.S.C.
§ 1881a(i)(1). If the ECSPs fail to comply, the AG may file a petition with the FISC to compel their
compliance. Id. § 1881a(i)(5)(A).
68. See, e.g., FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-118, tit. I, 132 Stat.
3, 4 (2018) (explaining the statutorily required safeguards, accountability, and oversight).
69. The CIA and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) also have authority to conduct
intelligence collection activities under Section 702 and minimization procedures to govern their
activities. See generally CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF
1978, AS AMENDED (2016) [hereinafter CIA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES].
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Targeting and Minimization Procedures Protect U.S. Person
Information

As the only agency that can initiate data collection, the NSA regulates
all data acquisition occurring under Section 702 with its targeting
procedures.70 After acquisition, each agency’s minimization procedures
regulate the retention, dissemination, and use of the data.71 Each agency
acquiring or accessing Section 702 intelligence must develop and comply
with its respective minimization procedures.72 As of the latest annual
report in April 2018, the NSA is authorized to collect intelligence on
129,080 foreign targets.73 This section will define targeting procedures
that govern data acquisition and other minimization procedures used to
reduce the collection of U.S. person information.
a.

Surveillance Targets Must Not Be U.S. Persons

Under Section 702, intelligence agencies “target” persons74 for
intelligence collection by “tasking” specific “selectors.”75 A selector must
be a unique communications facility, such as a telephone number or email
address associated with a target, and cannot be a keyword or name, such
as “bomb” or “al-Baghdadi.”76 The user of a tasked selector is the
Section 702 “target.”77 Targets of collection may not include U.S. persons
or “any person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United
States.”78
The NSA’s targeting procedures require analysts to make two
assessments when identifying potential targets: (1) the “foreignness”
requirement and (2) a determination that the person possesses or is likely

70. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a; PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7.
71. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 6–7.
72. See generally CIA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 69; FBI MINIMIZATION
PROCEDURES, supra note 16; NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 13.
73. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, supra note 63, at 14.
74. “Person” is defined broadly in the statute and may include a foreign government, terrorist
group, other entity or association, a corporation, or foreign power, in addition to individuals. PCLOB
REPORT, supra note 7, at 20–21 (discussing 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(a), 1801(m)).
75. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 32.
76. Id. at 33; NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, NSA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT SECTION 702, at 4 (2014) [hereinafter NSA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF FISA],
https://fas.org/irp/nsa/clpo-702.pdf [https://perma.cc/9WUP-7F62].
77. Id. at 32–33.
78. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(1).
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to possess approved foreign intelligence information.79 The “foreignness”
assessment requires analysts to assess and determine that each potential
target is a non-U.S. person located outside the United States.80 This test is
“not a 51% to 49% ‘foreignness’ test”81—the analyst must resolve any
ambiguities regarding location or status of a target as a U.S. person before
making the foreignness determination.82 In addition to the foreignness
requirement, the analyst must determine that tasking a specific selector
will likely lead to the acquisition of foreign intelligence information that
falls within one of the categories identified by the government in its
annual certification approved by the FISC.83 Unlike traditional FISA, the
FISC does not review the individual persons who will be surveillance
targets; rather, under Section 702, it reviews categories of intelligence
about which targets must be likely to communicate.84 Upon making those
determinations, the analyst assesses “how, when, with whom, and where
the target communicates” to ascertain a specific selector to be tasked.85
Two senior analysts must review the analyst’s determination to ensure that
the tasking request meets the NSA’s targeting procedure requirements.86
After review, the AG and DNI issue directives to ECSPs and
companies that maintain communications networks to compel their
assistance in acquiring intelligence.87 ECSPs must assist the IC in
collecting communications to and from authorized targets for a period of
up to one year.88 Even after the intelligence collection begins, the NSA
79. NSA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF FISA, supra note 76, at 43; PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 23.
Additionally, the statute expressly prohibits “reverse targeting,” or using the targeting of a foreigner
abroad to collect intelligence on a “particular, known person” inside the United States. 50 U.S.C.
§ 1881a(b)(2).
80. NSA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF FISA, supra note 76, at 43; PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 23.
81. NSA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF FISA, supra note 76, at 4.
82. Id.; PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 43.
83. See PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 45. The scope of categories in these executive
certifications has not been declassified, but officials in the IC have stated that the certifications
concern international terrorism and acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, among others. NAT’L
SEC. AGENCY, PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY FOR TARGETING NONUNITED STATES PERSONS REASONABLY BELIEVED TO BE LOCATED OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES TO
ACQUIRE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED 4–6 (2017) [hereinafter NSA TARGETING
PROCEDURES 2016]; PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 25.
84. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 24–27.
85. NSA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF FISA, supra note 76, at 4.
86. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 46. These tasking requests are also subject to external
oversight by the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Office of the DNI. The DOJ and the Office of
the DNI review the tasking and targeting decisions to ensure statutory compliance. Id. at 70–72.
87. Id. at 32.
88. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(a) (2018).
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has post-tasking requirements.89 NSA analysts routinely review samples
of Section 702 acquired communications to verify that tasked selectors
remain associated with foreign intelligence and the target remains
abroad.90 Analysts also reevaluate each selector annually to determine
whether it continues to meet the requirements—foreignness and foreign
intelligence purpose—specified in NSA targeting procedures.91 Upon
determining that a selector is a U.S. person or located in the United States,
the NSA sends a request to the ECSP acquiring intelligence to detask, or
halt collection, on the relevant selector.92
b.

Minimization Procedures Are Designed to Balance Privacy with
National Security

After acquisition, and before an agency moves data to a permanent
retention database, trained personnel must review data to ensure it is
limited only to requested information and meets the agency’s standards
for retention.93 If personnel find U.S. person information in collected data,
such data must be “necessary to understand foreign intelligence
information, . . . assess its importance,” or provide evidence of a crime to
be permanently retained.94 Information that has been reviewed by an
analyst and determined to meet this standard is considered “minimized.”95

89. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 48.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Any data acquired from a selector while that selector is in the United States (or after
determination that the target is a U.S. person) must be purged. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 61.
Additionally, errors must generally be reported to the DNI, the Department of Justice, Congress, and
sometimes the FISC. 50 U.S.C. § 1881f(b)(1)(G); PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 66–68; OFFICE
OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, FACT SHEET: SEMIANNUAL ASSESSMENT OF COMPLIANCE
WITH PROCEDURES AND GUIDELINES ISSUED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE
ACT
(FISA)
(2017),
https://www.dni.gov/
files/documents/icotr/Overview_Fact_Sheet-702-Joint-Assessment13-14-15-11017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C55Y-HSX9].
93. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 60–62.
94. FBI MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 16, at 22; NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES,
supra note 13, at 12–13.
95. If the analyst determines through this review that the tasked selector will not yield the requested
information (e.g., that johndoe@isp.com is not going to be used to communicate about international
terrorism), the government will send a de-tasking request to the communications provider to halt
collection for that specific selector. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 34, 61–63.
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As a security measure, each agency separately retains data.96 As such,
each agency must create and follow its own minimization procedures.97
According to the statute, such procedures must be “reasonably designed”
to “minimize the acquisition and retention . . . of nonpublicly available
information concerning unconsenting United States persons” that may be
collected during authorized intelligence collection.98 Information that has
not yet been reviewed and evaluated by government personnel is kept in
repositories separate from minimized data.99 Because unminimized data
runs a higher risk of including U.S. person information, each agency’s
minimization procedures limit the access of such data to trained
personnel, and it generally must be aged off agency systems within five
years.100 Broadly speaking, the process proceeds as follows: after
acquisition, IC personnel review collected data to minimize the retention
of U.S. person information; then, data will be either purged or retained
based on the result of that evaluation.
2.

U.S. Person Communications May Be Lawfully Incidentally
Collected

Because U.S. persons and persons located inside the United States
cannot be targets, Section 702 does not permit the comprehensive
collection of communications from a single U.S. person. In other words,
the government will not have access to all emails or telephone calls sent
by any specific U.S. citizen under this program (absent mistake or
abuse).101 Even so, U.S. person information may be acquired incidentally
or inadvertently during authorized intelligence collection.102 This section
first explains how the IC conducts Section 702 intelligence acquisition

96. See id. at 54, 60–63.
97. See id. at 50–59. The agencies each have provisions in their minimization procedures allowing
them to depart from approved procedures in cases of “immediate threat to human life” (e.g., a hostage
situation). NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 13, at 1. Any departure must be reported to
the National Security Division of the Department of Justice and, subsequently, to the FISC. Id.; FBI
MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 16, at 3.
98. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h)(1) (2018); see NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 13, at 1.
99. NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 13, at 53.
100. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 53, 55–56; see FBI MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note
16, at 22; NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 13, at 5.
101. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a; PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 113–14.
102. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 6. Prior to the NSA halting “about” collection,
communications between U.S. persons might also have been acquired when a targeted selector (e.g.,
the email address of a targeted suspected terrorist) appeared in the body of an email between U.S.
persons. See id. at 113.
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and then how U.S. person information may be lawfully included in that
acquisition.
a.

Data Acquisition Occurs via PRISM and Upstream Collection

Initially, agencies could acquire data either by downstream collection
or upstream collection, both of which are defined below.103 In April 2017,
however, the NSA ceased most forms of upstream collection and limited
others.104 Thus, Section 702 data acquisition is now conducted primarily
by PRISM, the code name for the NSA’s downstream surveillance tool.105
The NSA receives all communications acquired through PRISM, and the
NSA, CIA, FBI, and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) each have
access to raw PRISM-acquired data.106 The NSA is the only agency that
receives and retains unminimized data acquired through upstream
collection.107 All told, the FBI receives approximately 4.3% of the NSA’s
total collection.108
PRISM collection involves compelling the assistance of various
ECSPs.109 For example, an NSA analyst investigating lead information
about John Doe—a non-U.S. person living outside the United States—
discovers John Doe uses a specific email address (e.g.,
103. Id. at 33.
104. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 33; Press Release, NSA, NSA Stops Certain Section 702
“Upstream” Activities (Apr. 28, 2017) [hereinafter NSA Statement], https://www.nsa.gov/newsfeatures/press-room/Article/1618699/nsa-stops-certain-section-702-upstream-activities
[https://perma.cc/Y3D8-E6B6].
105. PRISM technically stands for “Planning Tool for Resource Integration, Synchronization, and
Management,” but it is known by its code word, “PRISM.” Benjamin Dreyfuss & Emily Dreyfuss,
What Is the NSA’s PRISM Program? (FAQ), CNET (June 7, 2013, 11:44 AM),
https://www.cnet.com/news/what-is-the-nsas-prism-program-faq/ [https://perma.cc/WUK4-5Z9P].
106. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 53; Jordan Brunner et al., Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court Approves New Targeting and Minimization Procedures: A Summary, LAWFARE (May 15, 2017,
12:13 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/foreign-intelligence-surveillance-court-approves-newtargeting-and-minimization-procedures-summary [https://perma.cc/T8JP-34XN]. The CIA, FBI, and
NCTC, however, do not have access to any unminimized data collected by upstream collection
methods (only the NSA has this access). See PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 35.
107. See PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 39–40. MCTs are not entered into government databases
until they have been filtered to remove domestic transactions. Id. at 37, 54.
108. Devlin Barrett, FBI Director Warns Against Restricting Controversial NSA Surveillance
Program, WASH. POST (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/fbi-director-warns-against-restricting-controversial-nsa-surveillance-program/2017/10/13/
a40a0b3c-b02a-11e7-a908-a3470754bbb9_story.html?utm_term=.99234b0e8edb
[https://perma.cc/RN2M-ZJTN] (noting that FBI Director Christopher Wray has said “that 4.3 percent
is unbelievably valuable to our mission”).
109. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 33; see supra Section I.B.1.a for more information on the
compelled assistance of ECSPs.
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johndoe@gmail.com) to communicate with affiliates about international
terrorist activities.110 The NSA, following its targeting procedures, would
“task[]” that email address for Section 702 acquisition to obtain foreign
intelligence information falling within one of the pre-approved
intelligence categories by the FISC (here, presumably, international
terrorism).111 The IC then sends the tasked email address to an ECSP, and
the company must provide the government all communications sent to or
from the email address.112
Before April 2017, the NSA also acquired communications through a
second method—upstream collection.113 Upstream collection occurred by
intercepting communications directly from the communications
“backbone” (i.e., data that is transiting between the communications
networks), instead of the compelled assistance of a specific ECSP.114 In
upstream collection of internet communications, collection of internet
transactions is possible.115 An internet transaction may consist of a single
communication—for example, an email being sent from one server to
another—or multiple communications (MCTs)—for example, populating
a webmail server inbox, such as a Gmail inbox.116 The NSA’s filtering
mechanisms cannot distinguish between individual communications that
are purely between U.S. persons and the whole MCT, allowing the
possibility of collecting a communication merely “about” a tasked
selector.117 Accordingly, the FISC ordered the NSA to destroy an entire
MCT upon a determination that any communication within a transaction
is “not to or from persons targeted in accordance with NSA’s Section 702
targeting procedures.”118
In response, the NSA eliminated “about” collection from its acquisition
methods—thus eliminating a great deal of the communications previously
obtained through upstream collection and decreasing the likelihood of
110. PCLOB Report, supra note 7, at 34.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 13, at 4.
114. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 35.
115. An internet transaction is essentially several pieces of data traveling together “across the
Internet.” Id. at 39.
116. Id.; Parker Higgins, Intelligence Agency Attorney on How “Multi-Communication
Transactions” Allowed for Domestic Surveillance, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 21, 2013),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/08/intelligence-agency-attorney-explains-how-multicommunication-transactions-allowed [https://perma.cc/Y49D-V2YZ].
117. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 39–40.
118. [Redacted], 2011 WL 10947772, at *7–9 (FISA Ct. Nov. 30, 2011) (mem.); NSA
MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 13, at 4.
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acquiring U.S. person communications.119 Nevertheless, data formerly
acquired upstream remains stored in Section 702 databases and, until it is
aged off agency systems, analysts may still query such data. Only analysts
trained in reviewing MCTs may access that repository and MCTs must
age off NSA systems within two years.120 Other intelligence agencies
cannot view or query data collected upstream before the NSA applies its
minimization procedures.121 While the 2018 FAA reauthorization allows
the NSA to recommence “about” collection, it may only do so after
notifying Congress and receiving approval from the FISC.122 Absent some
technological development that allows the NSA to distinguish between
communications involving a target and communications merely “about”
a target, renewal of the program is unlikely.123
b.

U.S. Person Information May Be Collected Incidentally or
Accidentally

Incidentally collected U.S. person information—information obtained
when a U.S. person is communicating with a foreign target or when a
foreign target’s communications contain U.S. person information—may
be retained and used subject to minimization.124 Inadvertently (or
accidentally) collected U.S. person information, however, must generally
be destroyed.125
When a person who is targeted for surveillance communicates by
phone or email with another person, the second person’s information is
said to be “incidentally” collected.126 In the context of U.S. person
information, incidental collection occurs when a foreign target located

119. NSA Statement, supra note 104 (noting that the elimination of upstream collection also
reduced relevant foreign intelligence information); Adam Klein, The End of “About” Collection
Under Section 702, LAWFARE (May 1, 2017, 10:07 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/end-aboutcollection-under-section-702 [https://perma.cc/WP6T-5XA9].
120. NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 13, at 5 (requiring destruction of MCTs unless
the NSA determines that at least one of the communications in the transaction meets the agency’s
retention standards).
121. See generally id. (describing the procedures governing the NSA’s acquisition, retention,
access, use, and dissemination of Section 702 data).
122. FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-118, § 101, 132 Stat. 3 (2018).
123. George W. Croner, Terrorists, America Is Still Listening: Section 702 Is Alive and Well,
FOREIGN POL’Y RES. INST. (Jan. 22, 2018), https://fpri.org/article/2018/01/terrorists-america-stilllistening-section-702-alive-well/ [https://perma.cc/Z7MW-HTED].
124. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 6.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 114.
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overseas communicates with a U.S. person.127 Incidental collection can
also occur when two foreign targets located abroad discuss a U.S. person
in the contents of their communications (e.g., two targets being surveilled
under Section 702 are emailing, and the body of the email contains a
passport belonging to a U.S. person).128 The amount of U.S. person
communications acquired incidentally is unknown; however, the IC
targets approximately .004% of the world’s internet users for Section 702
surveillance and .001% of the world’s population.129 Therefore, the odds
of acquiring any one U.S. person’s communications incidentally are
incredibly low.
Sometimes, U.S. person communications, or the communications of
persons located in the United States, are collected accidentally.130
Accidental collections are referred to as “inadvertent” collection.131 For
example, inadvertent collection may occur when the NSA mistakenly
believes a target is a foreign citizen, or an analyst types a selector
incorrectly during the targeting process.132 Inadvertent collection can also
be a result of a technological malfunction.133 In 2013, the U.S. Department
of Justice reviewed the NSA’s annual data and determined that only 0.4%
of NSA’s targeting decisions resulted in the accidental targeting of U.S.
citizens or persons located within the United States.134 Any collection of
this type is generally subject to purge.135
3.

U.S. Person Identifiers May Be Used to Query Acquired Data

After an intelligence agency acquires data pursuant to the procedures
discussed above, personnel may access the data by querying the databases
in which the data is retained—both raw and minimized databases.136
Querying is used to access data already in the government’s possession
more quickly and efficiently; rather than examining single, discrete
127. See id.
128. See id. at 6, 114.
129. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, supra note 6.
130. See PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 116.
131. Id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. Id. at 44.
135. Id. at 6.
136. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 55. Queries of raw data are limited to trained personnel and
are subject to stricter requirements than queries of minimized data. Id. at 56–57 (explaining that, for
example, queries of unminimized data using U.S. person identifiers cannot be used to query MCTs
and content queries using U.S. person identifiers must be pre-approved).
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communications, analysts may query databases to retrieve information
readily.137 In this context, a “query” is a search of Section 702 acquired
data using specific terms—such as keywords or phrases, names, email
addresses, or phone numbers—to access previously collected
information.138 Such terms may be identifiers associated with U.S.
persons. Agencies may use U.S. person identifiers “as the first step in
evaluating and detecting potential threats to the homeland.”139 For
example, the NSA may query a database with the name of a government
official traveling abroad to identify threats by foreign adversaries, or the
name of a U.S. citizen who is held hostage abroad to pinpoint terrorist
communications indicating the location or condition of the hostage.140
All queries, involving U.S. persons or otherwise, must be reasonably
likely to return foreign intelligence information or evidence of a crime and
must be sufficiently tailored.141 U.S. person queries are subject to
additional limitations.142 The most recent reauthorization of Section 702
requires the AG and DNI to adopt “procedures consistent with the
requirements of the fourth amendment” to govern queries.143 These
procedures are subject to review by the FISC, and agencies must keep a
record of U.S. person query terms used.144 These limitations aim to reduce
the probability of returning non-pertinent U.S. person information.145
Agencies have differing requirements for content and metadata queries.
Content generally receives greater protection as it involves the substance
of communications, whereas metadata, or non-content, receives lesser

137. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, supra note 6. The NSA, FBI, CIA, and NCTC
each have access to databases of Section 702 data which they may query.
138. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 55.
139. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, supra note 6.
140. Id.
141. FBI MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 16, at 8–9; NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES,
supra note 13, at. 4–5; Chris Inglis & Jeff Kosseff, In Defense of FAA Section 702: An Examination
of Its Justification, Operational Employment, and Legal Underpinnings 14 (Hoover Inst. Working
Grp.
on
Nat’l
Sec.,
Tech.,
and
Law,
Paper
No.
1604,
2016),
https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/files/research/docs/ingliskosseff_defenseof702_final_v3_digit
al.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZK3W-ZT5U] (explaining that agencies are prohibited from using overbroad
queries to conduct “fishing expeditions”). For a discussion on new FBI requirements in the 2018
reauthorization, see infra notes 153–160.
142. NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 13, at 4–5; Brunner et al., supra note 106.
143. FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-118, § 101, 132 Stat. 3, 4–
5 (2018).
144. Id.; see NSA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF FISA, supra note 76, at 7.
145. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 56.
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protection as it is only the information about a communication.146 For
content queries, the NSA may use only pre-approved U.S. person
identifiers (e.g., FISC-approved under traditional FISA).147 NSA analysts
may also get approval for a U.S. person identifier query by making a
showing to the Office of the General Counsel that the identifier is
reasonably likely to yield foreign intelligence information.148 The NSA
conducts significantly fewer content queries using U.S. person identifiers
than metadata queries.149 To ensure compliance, the NSA conducts
periodic spot checks of queries.150 NSA procedures prohibit analysts from
querying any data collected upstream with known U.S. person identifiers;
only communications collected via PRISM151 may be queried using U.S.
person query terms.152
The FAA reauthorization imposes a probable cause court order
requirement for certain content, but not metadata, queries conducted by
the FBI.153 Essentially, the FBI must procure a court order prior to using
a U.S. person identifier to query Section 702 data in connection with a
“predicated criminal investigation” that is “not relate[d] to the national
security of the United States.”154 Importantly, the FBI’s investigation
process begins with an assessment phase prior to the “predicated” stage
of any investigation.155 The requirement is silent on queries conducted in
the assessment stage.156 The court order requirement is limited to
investigations and fails to address queries conducted absent an open
146. For example, metadata would include the number dialed on a telephone, email addresses from
which communications are sent and received, and the time stamps indicating when emails are sent or
received. For more information, see Orin Kerr, Relative vs. Absolute Approaches to the
Content/Metadata Line, LAWFARE (Aug. 25, 2016, 4:18 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/relativevs-absolute-approaches-contentmetadata-line [https://perma.cc/9EM2-8T2G].
147. NSA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF FISA, supra note 76, at 6–7.
148. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 57.
149. In 2017, the NSA conducted an estimated 7,512 content queries using terms concerning a
known U.S. person and an estimated 16,924 metadata or non-content queries using U.S. person
identifiers. These numbers count each query separately, even if the same identifier (e.g., the telephone
number 800-222-2222) is used in multiple queries. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE,
supra note 63.
150. NSA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF FISA, supra note 76, at 7.
151. See supra Section I.B.2.a for an explanation of PRISM collection.
152. NSA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF FISA, supra note 76, at 6–7.
153. FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-118, § 101, 132 Stat. 3, 4–
5 (2018).
154. Id.
155. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE 16
(2016).
156. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 57; see FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act § 101.
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criminal investigation.157 An exception to the requirement exists if the FBI
determines that “there is a reasonable belief” that the query results “could
assist in mitigating or eliminating a threat to life or serious bodily
harm.”158 The DNI and the NSD conduct periodic reviews of FBI queries
to ensure compliance with privacy protections.159 The court order
requirement does not apply to queries conducted by any other intelligence
agency.160
II.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE

The Fourth Amendment is the cornerstone of the privacy debate over
U.S. person queries. Any agency collecting Section 702 intelligence must
do so consistently with the Fourth Amendment.161 The statute expressly
mandates this constitutional compliance.162 Any Fourth Amendment
analysis concerning U.S. person queries must consider privacy risks
associated with such collection together with the statutory provisions
designed to mitigate such intrusions.
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects” by prohibiting “unreasonable
searches and seizures” by the government.163 In the modern technological
era, the Fourth Amendment has evolved from protecting only physical
searches to encompassing limitations on electronic surveillance.164 In
early jurisprudence involving electronic surveillance, courts held that the
Fourth Amendment did not protect intercepted telephonic
communications because they are not material things that can be searched
or seized—a.k.a. the trespass theory.165 However, in Katz v. United

157. See FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act § 101.
158. Id.
159. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 59.
160. FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act § 101.
161. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b)(5) (2018).
162. Id. § 1881a(b)(5).
163. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
164. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967); Riley v. California, 573 U.S.__, 134 S.
Ct. 2473, 2483–84 (2014) (describing the extent of privacy intrusions as much more significant when
government actors have access to digital information, particularly in the modern era of technological
advances).
165. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 465–66 (1928).
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States,166 the U.S. Supreme Court departed from Olmstead v. United
States,167 the foundational trespass theory case, and held that the Fourth
Amendment protects “people, not places.”168 As such, the Court redefined
a Fourth Amendment search as government conduct that violates a
person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.169 Even so, a warrantless
search may nonetheless be constitutional if it is reasonable—usually by
falling within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement.170 Some
courts and numerous scholars have also recognized a general
reasonableness approach to warrantless searches and seizures under the
Fourth Amendment.171 Fourth Amendment Warrant Clause jurisprudence
is increasingly decided on a case-by-case basis with analyses that turn on
policy considerations and imports of practicality.172
After Katz, the Court began to recognize Congress’s role in regulating
the acquisition of electronic evidence, and Congress has passed statutes in
response.173 In the ordinary law enforcement context, digital evidence
acquisition is regulated by a variety of statutes, including the Wiretap Act
166. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). The Katz Court expressly declined to determine whether warrantless
electronic surveillance would be permitted in national security cases. Id. at 358 n.32.
167. 277 U.S. 438 (1928), overruled in part by Berger v. State of N.Y., 388 U.S. 41 (1967) and
Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
168. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
169. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); Kyllo v. United States, 535 U.S. 27, 33 (2001) (citing
Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
170. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
171. E.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 571–73 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court
has vacillated between imposing a categorical warrant requirement and applying a general
reasonableness standard.” Id. at 572); United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 118–19 (2001) (holding
a warrantless search to be constitutional under a “general Fourth Amendment approach” of
reasonableness); United States v. Muhtorov, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1240, 1254 (D. Colo. 2015) (finding
“the special need/foreign intelligence exception argument somewhat academic and limiting, because
the standard ultimately is one of reasonableness”); Oren Bar-Gill & Barry Friedman, Taking Warrants
Seriously, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1609, 1612–13 (2012) (discussing the “collapse of the warrant
requirement” and the rise of a general reasonableness approach); Nikolaus Williams, The Supreme
Court’s Ahistorical Reasonableness Approach to the Fourth Amendment, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1522,
1524 (2014) (“Increasingly, the Court has abandoned its preference for warrants for . . . the
reasonableness interpretation.”).
172. See Corey M. Then, Searches and Seizures of Americans Abroad: Re-Examining the Fourth
Amendment’s Warrant Clause and the Foreign Intelligence Exception Five Years After United
States v. Bin Laden, 55 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1072 (“[T]he so-called warrant requirement is clearly a
misnomer in that it is not absolute and there is a laundry list of searches and seizures that either
historically or currently do not require a warrant. . . .” (citations omitted)).
173. See, e.g., Brian M. Kistner, The Fourth Amendment in the Digital World: Do You Have an
Expectation of Privacy on the Internet? 20–21 (2016) (unpublished manuscript) (Seton Hall Univ.
L. Sch. Student Scholarship, https://scholarship.shu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1830
&context=student_scholarship [https://perma.cc/73SL-9SSP]) (discussing Congressional response
to Katz in passing the Wiretap Act/Title III).
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(Title III).174 Before a domestic criminal wiretap can occur, a warrant must
be issued that indicates—with particularity—the phone line to be tapped,
the conversation to be seized, and the crime under investigation.175 Only
after the government secures a warrant may it collect the target’s
communications, including the incidental communications of the
receiving-end of the conversation.176 In the foreign intelligence context,
electronic evidence is regulated largely by traditional FISA, the FAA
including Section 702, and Executive Order (EO) 12333.177 These
regulations are designed to allow surveillance and acquisition of digital
evidence for proper law enforcement and intelligence purposes, but deny
surveillance in unlawful circumstances. In the national security context,
or at least insofar as “foreign powers or their agents” are involved, courts
have expressly invited Congress to establish statutory guidelines for
electronic surveillance.178 As such, the relevant statutory provisions are
critical in analyzing the reasonableness of searches in the context of
electronic evidence.
Before examining whether government conduct is reasonable, courts
must find that the conduct falls within the protections of the Fourth
Amendment. As such, the below sections will address the following:
(1) how courts define searches and seizures; (2) when conduct is defined
as a search or seizure, how courts determine whether the conduct is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment; and (3) how the digital age
affects Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, including case law squarely
addressing Section 702 queries and other electronic surveillance.

174. Wiretap Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522 (2018) [hereinafter Title III]; see also Stored
Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2712 (2018); Pen-Register/Trap and Trace Statutes, 18
U.S.C. §§ 3121–3127 (2018).
175. 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (requiring a court order for a criminal wiretap); U.S. CONST. amend. IV
(requiring warrants to be supported by evidence “particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized”).
176. 18 U.S.C. § 2518.
177. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981), amended by Exec. Order No.
13,284, 68 Fed. Reg. 4,075 (Jan. 23, 2003); Exec. Order No. 13,355, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,594 (Aug. 27,
2004); and Exec. Order No. 13,470, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,325 (July 30, 2008).
178. United States v. United States Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 322–23 (1972); see also
United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 914 (4th Cir. 1980) (“Perhaps most crucially, the
executive branch not only has superior expertise in the area of foreign intelligence, it is also
constitutionally designated as the pre-eminent authority in foreign affairs.”).
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Digital Searches are Defined by Reasonableness and Government
Access to Seized Data

Underlying the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness analysis are the
definitions of a “search” and a “seizure.” As the scope of the Fourth
Amendment is limited to searches and seizures, government activity must
qualify as a search or seizure to fall within the ambit of its protection.179
Whether conduct constitutes a search for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment goes directly to the reasonableness of the search—a search
is defined as government action that violates an individual’s reasonable
expectation of privacy.180 A seizure is generally defined as the taking of
physical property or “some meaningful interference with an individual’s
possessory interests in that property.”181 An understanding of how
searches and seizures have been interpreted in both physical and digital
searches provides a framework for how Section 702 querying should be
viewed under the Fourth Amendment.
Unlike physical searches, digital searches are usually conducted by
copying some form of original data—whether it is an entire hard drive, a
single file, a specific communication, etc.—and reviewing that data in a
different location.182 Note that in Section 702 terms, the “copying” occurs
at the acquisition stage, and the review occurs when agency analysts query
the respective database. Accordingly, courts have recognized distinct
Fourth Amendment rules to respond to the unique privacy challenges of
digital searches.183
In the context of digital searches, courts often consider the moment
when data “is exposed to human observation”184 to be the relevant point
for determining whether a search occurred. For example, in Kyllo v.
United States,185 the Court found that the output of measurements
emanating from a heat-sensing device constituted a search.186 In Kyllo, the
179. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
180. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
181. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984); see also Soldal v. Cook Cty., 506 U.S.
56, 68 (1992) (finding that “seizures of property are subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny even
though no search within the meaning of the Amendment has taken place”).
182. Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 540–41 (2005).
183. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014) (analogizing the
government’s argument that computer searches are “materially indistinguishable” from physical
searches to “saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon” and
concluding that digital-specific searches require specific Fourth Amendment rules).
184. Kerr, supra note 182, at 548.
185. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
186. Id. at 35.
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search occurred not when the radiation signal was emitted into the air, but
when federal agents observed the contents of the home in the form of
measurements from the thermal technology.187 Notably, the Kyllo Court
reasoned that the use of technological advances in the context of Fourth
Amendment searches—specifically, the government’s ability to search a
person’s home without notice to the occupants—violated the reasonable
expectation of privacy test.188 Similarly, in Riley v. California,189 the
Court used this same basic reasoning to find that a police officer may
lawfully seize a person’s cell phone; however, the officer must usually
obtain a warrant before accessing, or searching, that phone’s contents.190
In these cases, the government “searched” the data not when it obtained
information per se, but when authorities actually observed the data.191
The question of when a seizure occurs in the digital context, and
particularly in electronic surveillance, is more doctrinally uncertain.192 On
the one hand, some courts have found that copying and control over
original computer files constitutes a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment.193 In the context of Section 702, copying and control over
digital evidence is akin to acquisition and retention. For example, in
United States v. Ganias,194 the Second Circuit concluded that the
government’s permanent retention of an individual’s personal computer
records constituted a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes.195 In
finding that the government “overseized” non-relevant files, the court
ruled that the government must delete all files not described by the
warrant.196 When considering a similar question in United States v.
Carey,197 the Tenth Circuit ruled that data unexposed by the initial search
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
190. Id. at 2484–85.
191. See Kerr, supra note 182, at 548.
192. Orin Kerr, Fourth Amendment Seizures of Computer Data, 119 YALE L.J. 700, 705–09 (2010);
see generally Note, Digital Duplications and the Fourth Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1046 (2016).
193. Compare United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 137 (2d Cir. 2014) (finding that copying
computer data constituted a seizure), and United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078, 1088–89 (10th
Cir. 2009) (assuming that copying a hard drive constituted a seizure), with United States v. Jefferson,
571 F. Supp. 2d 696, 704 (E.D. Va. 2008) (finding that FBI agents taking photographs or notes of
what agents saw in defendant’s home interfered with the homeowner’s sole possession of such items
and, thus, constituted a search under the Fourth Amendment).
194. 755 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 824 F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016).
195. Id. at 137.
196. Orin Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital Evidence, 48 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 1, 9 (2015);
Ganias, 755 F.3d at 137–40.
197. 172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999).

13 - Adams.docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

3/25/2019 8:40 PM

U.S. PERSON QUERIES

427

was beyond the scope of the warrant.198 In Carey, a law enforcement agent
searching a computer for evidence of drug sales discovered evidence of
child pornography and subsequently abandoned the initial search to find
additional evidence of child pornography. The first discovered image was
reasonable, but the proceeding findings, or nonresponsive data, exceeded
the scope of the lawful search.199 In other words, when the government
shifted to seeking information for a purpose other than the initial purpose
of the search, the government was required to obtain a warrant. The
Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in ACLU v. Clapper,200
deciding that storing metadata in a database amounts to a seizure under
the Fourth Amendment.201
On the other hand, some courts have found that copying data does not
constitute a seizure because the original data “remain[s] intact and
unaltered” and the owner may still access it.202 As such, the reasoning
goes, the copying does not interfere with the owner’s possessory rights to
that information. In the Fourth Amendment context, these courts find that
the government did not take or seize property when it copied data.203
Importantly, each of these opinions treats the government’s control over
data differently than their access to that data under the Fourth
Amendment. Whether or not the courts find a seizure where data was

198. Compare United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1273 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that a law
enforcement agent exceeded the scope of a search warrant for drug sales when he “abandoned” that
search to look for evidence of child pornography), with United States v. Slanina, 283 F.3d 670, 680
(5th Cir. 2002), vacated on other grounds, 537 U.S. 802 (2002), aff’d, 359 F.3d 356, 358 (5th Cir.
2004) (holding that a comprehensive computer search did not violate the Fourth Amendment where
search of a portion of the computer had been justified). Note that the Court’s recent opinions indicate
agreement with the former approach—treating different “files” on a single computer, or purposes of
evidence collection, separately—at least in the context of aggregated digital evidence insofar as a
justification to search a particular file will not likely justify a comprehensive digital search. See Riley
v. California, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014) (noting concerns about the vast amount of data
contained within a cell phone); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) (sharing similar concerns).
199. Carey, 172 F.3d at 1273. Nonresponsive data is generally defined as information that does not
directly respond to, or is outside the scope of, an initial search warrant. For more information and an
argument to limit government use of such data, see generally Orin Kerr, Executing Warrants for Digital
Evidence: The Case for Use Restrictions on Nonresponsive Data, 48 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1 (2015).
200. 785 F.3d 787 (2d. Cir. 2015).
201. ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 801 (2d. Cir. 2015).
202. United States v. Gorshkov, No. CR00-550C, 2001 WL 1024026, at *3 (W.D. Wash. May 23,
2001); see also Arizona v. Hicks 480 U.S. 321, 323–24 (1987) (finding that copying a serial number
from a stereo system did not constitute a seizure).
203. In re Application of the United States of Am. for a Search Warrant for Contents of Elec. Mail,
665 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1222 (D. Or. 2009).
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copied and retained, courts distinguish between copying and retention
versus the government’s observation of the data.204
By extension, the Court has not squarely addressed when precisely a
seizure occurs in electronic surveillance but tends to use the conjunctive
“search and seizure” when dealing with such cases. For example, in both
Berger v. New York205 and Katz, the Court refers to surveillance as a
“search and seizure.”206 More recently, the Court used the disjunctive
“search or seizure” to refer to police officers putting a GPS device on an
individual’s vehicle and receiving location data from it.207 The Court,
however, resolved the Fourth Amendment question without
distinguishing between the search and seizure.208 This seems to be, in part,
because courts simply assume the existence of both a search and seizure—
or explicitly refer to one or the other without analysis when the conduct is
clearly a search, for example. Thus, courts avoid the somewhat technical
question—particularly in the digital realm—of when exactly searches and
seizures occur.209
In the modern era of “big data,”210 courts have struggled to adapt Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to the high-volume collection of digital
evidence. While the current law is complicated at best, two instructive
takeaways remain. First, courts distinguish between copying and retention
of data on the one hand, and the government’s access to that data on the

204. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014); Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27 (2001); Gorshkov, 2001 WL 1024026, at *3.
205. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
206. Id. at 54, 57; Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
207. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402 (2012).
208. See id. (finding that the government’s conduct was a search or seizure within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment based on the information received).
209. See, e.g., In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act (In re Directives), 551 F.3d 1004, 1012 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008) (referring to searches and seizures
in the FISA context but deciding the constitutionality of the surveillance without delineating the two);
Kerr, supra note 192, at 705–13 (analyzing the “seizure puzzle” created in applying seizure precedent
from physical property to digital evidence).
210. Roughly speaking, “big data” is a term used to describe extremely large, complex data sets and the
technological ability to collect, aggregate, and process a greater volume of that data than was possible in
the past. See EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BIG DATA: SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING
VALUES (2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report
_may_1_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/VE5D-82NR]; Big Data: What It Is and Why It Matters, SAS,
https://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/big-data/what-is-big-data.html [https://perma.cc/T4B9-GH3V]. Many
scholars have analyzed its implications for the Fourth Amendment and beyond. See Margaret Hu, Orwell’s
1984 and a Fourth Amendment Cybersurveillance Nonintrusion Test, 92 WASH. L. REV. 1819, 1856–60
(2017) (discussing the Fourth Amendment implications of big data apart from national security); Elizabeth
E. Joh, Policing by the Numbers: Big Data and the Fourth Amendment, 89 WASH. L. REV. 35 (2014); Paul
Ohm, The Fourth Amendment in a World Without Privacy, 81 MISS. L.J. 1309 (2011).
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other.211 Whether or not courts ultimately decide when and how the search
and seizure occurred, they place particular restrictions on searches and
seizures based on the government’s exposure to and observance of digital
evidence.212 Second, how the government conducts a search is relevant to
its overall reasonableness. Because the reasonableness of a search defines
whether a search occurred at all, the manner of a search’s execution is
crucial to any Fourth Amendment analysis.
B.

Limited Foreign Intelligence Surveillance is Reasonable Under the
Fourth Amendment

If government conduct qualifies as a search or seizure, it falls within
the protections of the Fourth Amendment.213 Generally, a warrantless
Fourth Amendment search is considered unreasonable if it does not fall
within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. Even so, the
discretionary application of the warrant exceptions and the far-reaching
scope of those exceptions involving foreign intelligence nearly eviscerate
the warrant preference in this context.214 In fact, some courts have
expressly stated that the benchmark for determining constitutionality in
intelligence cases is not the warrant requirement, but reasonableness.215 In
other cases, even when a warrantless search would ordinarily be
considered unreasonable, courts have found exceptions where

211. See, e.g., ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 801 (2d Cir. 2015) (distinguishing between
acquisition and retention in finding that storing data in a database constitutes a seizure); United States
v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1272–74 (10th Cir. 1999) (allowing the government to seize the entire hard
drive but limiting the government’s subsequent access to that data).
212. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484–85 (2014) (requiring a
warrant for a law enforcement officer to access the contents of a cell phone, even when the officer
lawfully seized the phone); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001) (finding that a search
occurred not where the government used heat-sensing technology, but when they observed the data
emanating from that technology).
213. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
214. See Jennifer Buffaloe, “Special Needs” and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised to
Swallow the Warrant Preference Rule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529, 530–31 (1997).
215. Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 322–23 (1972) (“Different standards may be compatible with the Fourth
Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for
intelligence information and the protected rights of our citizens.”); United States v. Abu-Jihaad, 630
F.3d 102, 121–22 (2d Cir. 2010) (concluding that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement is
“flexible” in light of “different purposes and practical considerations,” specifically mentioning
security and intelligence (quoting United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 72 (1984)); United States v.
Muhtorov, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1240, 1254 (D. Colo. 2015) (identifying the Fourth Amendment standard
as “one of reasonableness” rather than the warrant requirement and using that standard to determine
the constitutionality of Section 702 collection).
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governmental interests in national security or public safety are
involved.216
All searches, even those falling within a recognized warrant exception,
must be reasonable in scope and manner.217 To determine the
reasonableness of a search or a seizure, courts look to the manner or
method of execution and weigh individual privacy interests against the
nature of the government interest.218 A search is considered reasonable
when the government’s interest in the search or seizure outweighs the
interference with individual privacy.219
In assessing those factors, courts consider how the government
conducts a search.220 In the law enforcement context, courts look to the
way an officer conducts a search to determine the overall reasonableness
of the search. In United States v. Ramirez,221 a law enforcement officer
broke the defendant’s garage window to enter his home to execute a
search warrant.222 The U.S. Supreme Court considered the broken window
216. See United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 425–26 (5th Cir. 1973).
217. E.g., Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 448 (2013) (“Even if a warrant is not required, a search
is not beyond Fourth Amendment scrutiny; for it must be reasonable in its scope and manner of
execution.”); In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004, 1012–15 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008) (upholding
PAA surveillance under a foreign intelligence exception but finding that “governmental action
intruding on individual privacy interests must comport with the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness
requirement” (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983)).
218. E.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2473 (2014); King, 569 U.S. at 448;
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 427 (2004).
219. See, e.g., Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2478 (noting that “the Court generally determines whether to
exempt a given type of search from the warrant requirement ‘by assessing, on the one hand, the degree
to which it intrudes upon an individual’s privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed
for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests’” (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S.
295, 300 (1999))); Lidster, 540 U.S. at 421 (holding that police searches were “reasonable, hence,
constitutional” where public interests outweighed a minimal liberty interference); United States v.
Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 125 (1984) (finding that searches were reasonable where law enforcement
interests were substantial and the interference in private property was minimal); In re Directives, 551
F.3d at 1012–15 (finding surveillance under the PAA reasonable because the government’s interests
in national security outweighed the individual privacy interests); In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717,
742–43, 746 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002) (deciding that FISA surveillance is reasonable because
government interests in obtaining foreign intelligence information outweighed the liberty interests
involved).
220. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998) (“Excessive or unnecessary
destruction of property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the
entry itself is lawful and the fruits of the search are not subject to suppression.”); United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709–10 (1983) (finding no search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
where a canine sniff was “limited both in the manner in which the information [was] obtained and in
the content of the information revealed”).
221. 523 U.S. 65 (1998).
222. Id. at 65.
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in deciding whether the search violated the Fourth Amendment, noting
that a search may violate the Fourth Amendment if the government
excessively or unnecessarily destroys property “even though the entry
itself is lawful.”223 More succinctly, reasonably executing a search
supports a finding that a search is reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.
In the foreign intelligence context, courts often determine the
reasonableness of intelligence collection based, in part, on what happens
after collection.224 For example, the FISC and the FISA Court of Review
(FISCR) have recognized that the reasonableness of Section 702
collection depends on the acquisition and post-collection use of the
intelligence.225 Essentially, minimization procedures that protect U.S.
person information post-collection weigh in favor of the reasonableness
of the entire collection program under the Fourth Amendment.226
In United States v. United States District Court,227 better known as the
Keith case, the Court strongly suggested, though expressly left
unresolved, that foreign intelligence searches may be subject to less
stringent Fourth Amendment requirements than domestic law
enforcement searches.228 Though the holding rejected a departure from the
warrant requirement for domestic security surveillance, the Court
solidified the distinction between foreign and domestic intelligence
collection.229 The Court indicated that, in either case, the “legitimate need
of Government” may justify lessening the stringent Fourth Amendment
standards.230 Every circuit court to squarely decide the issue since has
upheld warrantless surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes.231 At
least pre-FISA, the foreign intelligence exception’s domestic applicability

223. Id. at 71 (“The general touchstone of reasonableness which governs Fourth Amendment
analysis . . . governs the method of execution of the warrant.”).
224. See, e.g., [Redacted], 2011 WL 10945618, at *7–11 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2011)
(determining Fourth Amendment reasonableness of FISA collection by assessing post-acquisition
minimization procedures).
225. See id. at *11 (looking to the NSA’s minimization procedures, including the retention, use,
and dissemination of MCTs to determine the overall reasonableness of the program).
226. Id.
227. 407 U.S. 297, 316–17 (1972).
228. Id. at 322. For more information on the foreign intelligence exception and its use outside the
pure intelligence context, see generally L. Rush Atkinson, The Fourth Amendment’s National Security
Exception: Its History and Limits, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1343 (2013).
229. Keith, 407 U.S. at 316–17, 321–23.
230. Id. at 315.
231. E.g., United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 913 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973).
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depended on whether the surveillance was done “primarily”232 for foreign
intelligence purposes and was “carefully limited to those situations in
which the interests of the executive are paramount.”233 Some courts have
also required the object of the surveillance to be a “foreign power, its
agent or collaborators.”234 Post-FISA, the FISCR held that a distinction
between a “primary” purpose and other purposes is based on a false
premise and is “inherently unstable, unrealistic, and confusing,”235 thus it
declined to adopt that approach when it considered the constitutionality of
electronic surveillance under traditional FISA.236
In this context, the warrant clause does not apply to searches abroad.
Some courts hold that a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant
requirement permits warrantless surveillance abroad; other courts simply
say that the warrant requirement does not apply outside the United
States.237 In 2008, the FISCR held that surveillance directed against
persons outside the United States for foreign intelligence purposes does
not require warrants.238 In In re Terrorist Bombings,239 the Second Circuit
held that foreign intelligence searches conducted abroad that involve U.S.
citizens do not require warrants.240 Generally, the foreign country’s law
controls for U.S. persons outside the United States and determines what
is “reasonable” under the Fourth Amendment in criminal cases and EO
232. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 915; see also Butenko, 494 F.2d at 606.
233. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 915.
234. Id.; see also Butenko, 494 F.2d at 596; Brown, 484 F.2d at 425.
235. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 743 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002); see also In re
Directives, 551 F.3d 1004, 1011 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008) (also rejecting the primary purpose
distinction, finding that whether the “programmatic purpose involves some legitimate objective
beyond ordinary crime control” is the appropriate consideration).
236. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 743.
237. Compare In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in E. Afr., 552 F.3d 157, 167 (2d Cir.
2008) (finding the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement to be inapplicable abroad), with In re
Directives, 551 F.3d at 1011–12 (applying the foreign intelligence exception to the Warrant Clause for
searches abroad), and United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp. 2d 264, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (adopting
the foreign intelligence exception to search Americans abroad for foreign intelligence purposes). Cf. In
re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 742–46 (assuming that FISA would survive whether or not the warrant
requirements were met); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“The proposition
is, of course, not that the Constitution ‘does not apply’ overseas, but that there are provisions in the
Constitution which do not necessarily apply in all circumstances in every foreign place.”).
238. Note that the FISA Court in In re Sealed Case expressly indicated that it did not hold that a
foreign intelligence exception exists because it presumed that the statute in question would survive
regardless of whether the warrant requirement applied, but later cases acknowledged that confirming
the existence of the exception is a plausible read of the FISA Court’s earlier opinion. See In re
Directives, 551 F.3d at 1012.
239. 552 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008).
240. Id. at 167.
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12333 controls foreign intelligence surveillance.241 The U.S. Supreme
Court has also found a comparable “special needs” exception when the
purpose of a search exceeds routine law enforcement and a warrant
requirement would materially interfere with that purpose.242 When the
Court determines that government interests are particularly imperative, it
lessens the warrant preference requirement in deference to government
needs.243 The Court engages in a “totality of the circumstances” balancing
test when “special needs” apply.244 In short, warrantless surveillance in
the United States or of U.S. persons located abroad for foreign intelligence
purposes has been consistently upheld subject only to Fourth Amendment
reasonableness requirements.
Moreover, the third-party doctrine bears on the Fourth Amendment
reasonableness requirement for electronic surveillance. The doctrine
establishes that an individual does not have a reasonable expectation of
privacy over information voluntarily revealed to a third-party, and
therefore the Fourth Amendment does not protect such information.245
The seminal case, Smith v. Maryland246 suggests that the Fourth

241. See generally AMOS TOH, ET AL., BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, OVERSEAS SURVEILLANCE IN
to FISA); cf. In
re Terrorist Bombings, 552 F.3d at 167 (discussing lack of precedent supporting foreign searches
conducted pursuant to American warrants and the inherent difficulty of extraterritorial application of
warrants issued by U.S. courts); United States v. Stokes, 726 F.3d 880, 893 (7th Cir. 2013) (holding
that the Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment does not apply extraterritorially to searches
conducted by U.S. agents).
242. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (explaining that the
exception to the warrant requirement applies “when special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement[s] impracticable” (quoting Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 33–34 (1968) (upholding stop-andfrisks to protect officer safety during investigatory stops).
243. See, e.g., Acton, 515 U.S. at 653 (upholding high school athlete drug testing and explaining
the special needs doctrine); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 533 (1967) (noting that application
of the warrant requirement “depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely
to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search”); United States v. Bin Laden, 126 F. Supp.
2d 264, 274 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (“[I]t is clear that imposition of a warrant requirement in the context of
foreign intelligence searches conducted abroad would be a significant and undue burden on the
Executive.”).
244. In “special needs” cases, the Court occasionally upholds warrantless searches even without
individualized suspicion. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 745 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002)
(discussing the Court’s special needs exception and applying it to FISA).
245. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
But see United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (noting that the
third-party doctrine is “ill suited to the digital age” and may require reexamination to address privacy
concerns).
246. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
AN INTERCONNECTED WORLD (clarifying the scope of EO 12,333 and its relationship
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Amendment does not protect non-content data247 that is given to or sent
via third-party providers.248 The Sixth Circuit held in United States v.
Warshak,249 however, that the Fourth Amendment does protect the
contents of emails, even when transmitted through a third party.250 Courts
have reasoned that the third-party is merely the conduit in such cases and,
therefore, the user maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in email
communications.251 The U.S. Supreme Court has raised concerns about
the future of the doctrine as applied to electronic surveillance: in United
States v. Jones,252 two concurring opinions suggested a willingness to
limit the reach of the doctrine as applied to government monitoring in the
digital age.253
As it stands, the Fourth Amendment does not prevent the government
from accessing communications, at least non-content data, voluntarily
provided to a third-party without a warrant. However, the Court recently
suggested that the doctrine has critical limits. In Carpenter v. United
States,254 the Court declined to extend the third-party doctrine to a case
involving government use of cell-site records to track an individual’s
movements for 127 days.255 In doing so, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for
the majority, wrote: “[T]he fact that the information is held by a third party
does not by itself overcome the user’s claim to Fourth Amendment
protection.”256 The decision ultimately makes applicable the protections
of the Fourth Amendment where the government accesses a user’s “cell
phone records that provide a comprehensive chronicle of the user’s past
movements,” at least if those records constitute seven days or more.257
The Court, however, narrowly defined the parameters of its opinion,
247. See supra note 146 and accompanying text for a primer on content vs. non-content data.
248. Smith, 442 U.S. at 746–47.
249. 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
250. Id. at 285–86. But see United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 442 (9th Cir. 2016) (finding
only a diminished expectation of privacy in email communications under the third-party doctrine
when a person sent communications to a third-party and did not voluntarily reveal those
communications to the government).
251. See RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43586, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
THIRD-PARTY Doctrine 1 (2014).
252. 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
253. Id. at 417 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (signaling that eliminating the third-party doctrine
altogether, for both content and metadata, may be necessary in the digital age); id. at 427–30 (Alito, J.,
concurring) (recognizing the effects of modern surveillance technologies on reasonable expectations of
privacy and the insufficiencies of current jurisprudence in responding to those changes).
254. 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
255. Id. at 2208–09.
256. Id. at 2217.
257. Id. at 2211–12.
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writing that the reasoning shall not apply to collection techniques
involving national security or foreign affairs.258
C.

High-Volume, Aggregate Data Collection is Subject to Distinct
Fourth Amendment Requirements

In recent years, technological advances and the expansion of
governmental electronic surveillance have prompted courts to begin
adapting, albeit slowly, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to modern
technology.259 In response to concerns arising from the large volume of
data available for collection with advancing technology, courts have
drawn distinctions between the analog world and the digital world—
specifically between information revealed piecemeal and aggregated
data.260 Most recently, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly acknowledged
technology’s effect on the Fourth Amendment analysis in Riley.261 In
Riley, the Court focused on the many types of information and the
sensitivity of personal data contained within cell phones, concluding that
a warrantless search of the devices violates the Fourth Amendment, even
when it occurs during a lawful arrest.262 Specifically, the Court noted that
the government could access addresses, prescriptions, location
information, and search history all from the same device; thus, the
pervasiveness of the search made it unreasonable, even incident to a
lawful arrest, absent an exigent circumstance.263 Simply put, the

258. Id. at 2220.
259. See id. at 2208–09 (2018) (applying the Fourth Amendment to cell-site data used to track a
person); Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __,134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477–78 (2014) (deciding how Fourth
Amendment protections apply to the contents of a cell phone); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400,
401 (2012) (applying the Fourth Amendment to GPS surveillance).
260. See, e.g., Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2216–18 (analyzing Fourth Amendment concerns
specifically related to cell phone location information which can be “detailed, encyclopedic, and
effortlessly compiled”); Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490 (requiring heightened Fourth Amendment
protections for certain cell phone searches because data on cell phones provides “detailed information
about all aspects of a person’s life”); Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (framing the
issue in a digital search case as “whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the Government to ascertain, more or less at will,
their political and religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on”).
261. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484–85.
262. Id. While the language in Riley does suggest increased scrutiny for expansive digital searches,
the holding is limited to searches incident to arrest. Id. The opinion expressly states that it does “not
implicate the question whether the collection or inspection of aggregated digital information amounts
to a search under other circumstances.” Id. at 2489–90 n.1. Even so, the opinion is instructive for the
Court’s recognition that digital data capable of revealing aggregated, invasive information might
trigger Fourth Amendment protections not otherwise required. Id. at 2478–79.
263. Id. at 2494.
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intrusiveness of the government’s conduct itself bears on whether a search
is reasonable.
The Court recognized the same privacy implications in Jones when it
considered the reasonableness of a long-term GPS surveillance.264 While
the Jones Court rests its conclusion on the government’s physical trespass
in placing a GPS device on an individual’s vehicle, the concurrence
addressed the privacy implications of “aggregated” data collection.265 In
her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor expressed concern with the
government’s ability to connect a person’s “political and religious beliefs,
sexual habits, and so on” by conducting long-term surveillance.266 In sum,
precedent suggests that courts afford electronic data somewhat higher
protection than tangible objects, and a violation of a person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy occurs when the government has access to
aggregated personal information. Even so, the Court has not defined how
much data is too much for the government to access, and it is unclear if it
would have decided these cases differently if a nexus to foreign
intelligence had existed.
In the absence of a U.S. Supreme Court decision on the matter, the
District Court of Colorado and the FISC have squarely weighed in on the
constitutionality of queries.267 Both courts avoided the ultimate question
about what the Fourth Amendment requires by finding that queries are not
searches separate from the initial collection.268 Both courts determined
that the government’s query procedures must be considered in light of the
reasonableness of the entire surveillance program. 269 After deciding that
the queries should not be separate Fourth Amendment searches, the
district court in United States v. Muhtorov270 stated that evidence obtained
lawfully “may be shared with similar agencies without the need for
obtaining a warrant, even if sought to be used for an entirely different
purpose.”271 Thus, the district court held that the queries may be
conducted without warrants.272 The FISC similarly concluded that the
queries are part of a holistically reasonable Fourth Amendment analysis
264. Jones, 565 U.S. at 417.
265. Id. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
266. Id.
267. See [Redacted] (FISC 2015), 2015 ODNI 20160415, at *44–45 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev.
2015); United States v. Muhtorov, 187 F. Supp. 3d 1240, 1256 (D. Colo. 2015).
268. See FISC 2015, 2015 ODNI 20160415, at *44–45; Muhtorov, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1256.
269. See FISC 2015, 2015 ODNI 20160415, at *44–45; Muhtorov, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1256.
270. 187 F. Supp. 3d 1240 (D. Colo. 2015).
271. Id. at 1256.
272. See id.
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because the minimization procedures of each agency are designed to limit
unreasonable privacy intrusions.273 Moreover, the FISC was not
concerned that queries may be conducted to retrieve information for
purposes unrelated to that of the initial collection—it suggested that this
rarely happens and even searches of unrelated material may yield critical
foreign intelligence information.274 A case currently pending before the
Second Circuit may also have implications for U.S. person queries.275 The
judges addressed the use of U.S. person queries quite extensively during
oral arguments, but it is unclear whether the case will turn on that point
because the record is ambiguous as to when, or whether, a query occurred
in the context of that case.276
III. U.S. PERSON QUERIES ARE CONSTITUTIONAL SEARCHES
The constitutionality analysis for Section 702 U.S. person queries is
two-fold. First, a court must determine whether the query is considered a
search under the Fourth Amendment—or, more precisely, whether the
query is: (1) part of the overall Fourth Amendment event beginning with
data acquisition; (2) a separate search entirely from the surveillance; or
(3) a search while the initial collection is a seizure. Second, based on the
answer to the first question, the analysis turns to the Fourth Amendment
requirements placed on U.S. person queries. If the queries are searches,
are they nonetheless reasonable, and therefore constitutional? And, either
way, whether the queries are separate searches or part of an overall
singular Fourth Amendment event, what restrictions, if any, does the
Fourth Amendment place on those queries? This Part argues: (1) queries
are most accurately viewed as searches under the Fourth Amendment and
(2) U.S. person queries are reasonable searches based on the minimization
safeguards in place, the limited U.S. person information collected, and the
foreign intelligence nexus of acquired data.
Current Fourth Amendment precedent is behind the curve on electronic
evidence, and the relevant doctrine is complicated at best. Courts have
struggled to adapt the Fourth Amendment to modern surveillance
technologies and, as such, a clear answer does not exist. That said, courts

273. See FISC 2015, 2015 ODNI 20160415, at *44–45.
274. Id.
275. See Oral Argument, United States v. Hasbajrami, No. 11-CR-623 (2d Cir. 2016),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/full-oral-argument-audio-united-states-v-hasbajrami [https://perma.cc
/8CF3-RWX2] (oral arguments before the Second Circuit).
276. Id.

13 - Adams.docx (Do Not Delete)

438

3/25/2019 8:40 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:401

have consistently upheld warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance.277
Accordingly, U.S. person queries are constitutional searches under the
foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement. Queries are
reasonable searches given the magnitude of the national security interests
at stake, the piecemeal data available under Section 702 on U.S. persons,
and the extensive oversight afforded post-collection to Section 702
acquired data. Even so, the Fourth Amendment requires some delineation
between U.S. person queries required for foreign intelligence purposes
versus criminal investigative purposes—the former constitutional, the
latter risking an unreasonable seizure and generally requiring a probable
cause warrant.278 To explain why, the following sections will analyze each
conclusion.
A.

Querying Section 702 Databases Amounts to a Fourth Amendment
“Search”

To fall within the ambit of Fourth Amendment protections, an
unreasonable search or seizure must have occurred.279 As applied to
Section 702 queries, the government has argued—and at least two courts
have agreed—that querying is not a separate search under the Fourth
Amendment; it is an element of the overall surveillance under
Section 702.280 Essentially, the minimization procedures and substantial
oversight afforded to Section 702 surveillance render the search
reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes. Rather than deal with the
technicality of when and how the search occurs in electronic surveillance,
prior courts have avoided the question altogether by deciding that the
holistic surveillance, including querying, is reasonable and thus not
violative of the Fourth Amendment.281
In support of these arguments, the government and the courts have
analogized Section 702 querying to criminal wiretaps and traditional law
277. Muhtorov, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1253–57 (upholding Section 702 surveillance under a
reasonableness approach rather than a warrant exception); In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004, 1008,
1012 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008) (holding that warrantless surveillance “to obtain foreign
intelligence for national security purposes . . . directed against foreign powers or agents of foreign
powers reasonably believed to be located outside the United States” is constitutional); In re Sealed
Case, 310 F.3d 717, 743 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002); see also FISC 2015, 2015 ODNI
20160415, at *44–45 (permitting queries as part of a reasonable search pursuant to the foreign
intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement); supra notes 237–244 and
accompanying text.
278. See infra notes 339–346 and accompanying text.
279. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
280. See FISC 2015, 2015 ODNI 20160415, at *44–45; Muhtorov, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1256.
281. See FISC 2015, 2015 ODNI 20160415, at *44–45; Muhtorov, 187 F. Supp. 3d at 1256.

13 - Adams.docx (Do Not Delete)

2019]

3/25/2019 8:40 PM

U.S. PERSON QUERIES

439

enforcement searches under the plain view doctrine. The government has
argued that if the U.S. person information was already lawfully collected,
then queries tailor the lawfully collected communications for more
efficient access.282 However, the distinction is a critical one that courts
should clarify in the world of big data. If a query is a Fourth Amendment
search, then data not yet queried retains the same Fourth Amendment
protection it had before it was “copied” (or otherwise acquired).283 In other
words, the government’s argument is not persuasive. The data sitting in
agency databases, before it is queried, has been acquired but not
observed—i.e., it has been seized but not searched.
As an initial matter, the government’s likening of Section 702 queries
to criminal wiretaps or traditional law enforcement searches is wholly
unconvincing. Even in the digital realm, the reasonable expectation of
privacy test determines whether a search occurred. Since Katz, searches
have been defined, in part, by an individual’s subjective expectation of
privacy.284 Today—notwithstanding the constitutionality of the collection
itself—the U.S. government would not seriously maintain that U.S.
persons do not have an expectation of privacy over the contents of their
private communications, email or otherwise, even when transmitted
through a third-party provider.285 Though the Court has not expressly held
that individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their emails,
the trajectory of the third-party doctrine and Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence is highly indicative that the court will move in that
direction.286 As such, the differences between criminal wiretaps and
Section 702 surveillance are troublesome for the government’s
arguments.
282. Answering Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee at 131–34, United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420
(9th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-30217) [hereinafter Mohamud Government Brief].
283. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and Querying the 702 Database for Evidence of
Crimes, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 20, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news /volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/10/20/the-fourth-amendment-and-querying-the-702database-for-evidence-of-crimes/ [https://perma.cc/E3X4-M2MY].
284. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (establishing the reasonable expectation
of privacy test for Fourth Amendment searches).
285. See United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285–86 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that contents of
emails are protected, even when transmitted through a third party); Laura K. Donohue, The Fourth
Amendment in a Digital World, 71 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 553, 650–61 (2017).
286. See, e.g., Carpenter v. United States, 585 U.S. __, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216–17 (2018) (refusing
to extend the third-party doctrine to cell phone location data collected by wireless carriers); United
States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 417–18 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (suggesting that the Court
may need to reassess the third-party doctrine in the digital age); Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (holding
that the Fourth Amendment does protect the contents of emails, even when transmitted through
a third-party).
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In contrast to criminal wiretaps, Section 702 surveillance does not
begin with a warrant.287 The FISC does not approve individual targets.288
The surveillance does not require probable cause.289 Instead, the FISC
must approve only categories of foreign intelligence, and there is no
requirement that the targets of surveillance be engaged in international
terrorism or criminal activity—it is enough that the government believes
a person may possess information about such activity for purposes of
Section 702 collection.290 And, as distinguished Fourth Amendment
scholar Orin Kerr points out, targeting is a foreign intelligence statutory
concept, not a Fourth Amendment one.291 Despite the FISC’s issuance of
a statutorily required order and an express prohibition of targeting U.S.
persons, U.S. persons retain reasonable expectations of privacy in their
private communications—particularly when the search occurs within the
United States.292 This suggests that querying the databases with U.S.
person identifiers to obtain U.S. person information is subject to a more
stringent analysis than the government and the courts have previously
found.
In the digital world, courts have distinguished acquisition from access
to determine where the Fourth Amendment’s protections apply. The
tendency of courts to analyze the constitutionality of a search based on the
government’s access to data, especially in the digital realm, suggests that
287.
288.
289.
290.
291.

50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2018).
PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 6.
Id.
See id. at 115.
Orin S. Kerr, The Surprisingly Weak Reasoning of Mohamud, LAWFARE: FISA: 702
COLLECTION (Dec. 23, 2016, 7:30 AM), www.lawfareblog.com/surprisingly-weak-reasoningmohamud# [https://perma.cc/PX7C-VM9Q] (arguing that there is no “targeting” doctrine in Fourth
Amendment law).
292. None of this is to say that the incidental collection of U.S. person information itself is
unlawful; in fact, there is good reason to think that it is not. Criminal wiretap cases are distinguishable
from any surveillance conducted under Section 702. In wiretap cases, the targets at issue can be U.S.
citizens and the surveillance takes place on U.S. soil. Because Section 702 collection is the
surveillance of non-U.S. persons located abroad, no warrant is required for the initial surveillance to
be lawful. The government cannot be expected to have prior knowledge of a target’s communications
with a 702 target. See [Redacted], 2011 WL 10945618 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2011); In re
Directives, 551 F.3d 1004, 1012 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008); United States v. Hasbajrami, No.
11-CR-623, 2016 WL 1029500, at *17 (E.D.N.Y. 2016) (discussing the difference between
Section 702 surveillance and criminal wiretaps); Mohamud Government Brief, supra note 282, at
102–08 (explaining that incidental collection of U.S. person information is lawful where the initial
acquisition of data emanating from a non-U.S. person overseas is constitutionally permissible). The
government has also argued that the incidental overhear doctrine makes legal the collection of U.S.
person communications in Section 702 surveillance. Oral Argument, United States v. Hasbajrami,
No. 11-CR-623 (2d Cir. 2016), https://www.lawfareblog.com/full-oral-argument-audio-united-statesv-hasbajrami [https://perma.cc/8CF3-RWX2] (oral arguments before the Second Circuit).
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a search occurs, not when authorities collect it, but when it is accessed or
observed by humans. For instance, government agents access data when
they query Section 702 databases.293
That leaves two approaches for querying under the Fourth Amendment:
(1) either queries and acquisition are two separate searches, or (2) the
initial collection is the seizure, while querying is the search. As stated
above, the approach most consistent with already-existing precedent on
computer searches seems to be that querying is the search, while
acquisition is the seizure. In digital evidence cases outside of the
surveillance context, courts have often viewed the government’s copying
of computer files, hard drives, etc. as a seizure.294 For example, in United
States v. Ganias295 and United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing,296
the Second and Ninth Circuits, respectively, referred to copied data as
seized data.297 Additionally, the Court referred to wiretapping as a “search
and seizure” in both Katz and Berger.298 While not conclusive, this
conjunctive use suggests that the Court viewed the recording or
acquisition of the data as a seizure. That said, both approaches concluding
that querying amounts to a search for Fourth Amendment purposes—
whether that querying and collection are both searches or that querying is
the search while the collection is the seizure—are plausible under current
computer search precedent.299 For purposes of this Comment, the
approach a court takes to conclude that a query is a search makes little
difference. To be sure, the second approach, viewing queries as separate
293. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2473–94 (2014) (holding that a
law enforcement officer’s digital cell phone search violated the Fourth Amendment even though the
officer lawfully seized the phone); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001) (finding that the
government searched the home not when it used thermal-imaging technology but when it observed
the heat emanations revealing the contents of the person’s home).
294. See United States v. Ganias, 755 F.3d 125, 141 (2d Cir. 2014), aff’d on reh’g en banc, 824
F.3d 199 (2d Cir. 2016); United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1168
(9th Cir. 2010).
295. 755 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2014).
296. 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010).
297. Comprehensive Drug Testing, 755 F.3d at 169–71; Ganias, 755 F.3d at 136, 141.
298. See Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 53–55 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
356–59 (1967).
299. Some courts and scholars have suggested that copying data is neither a search nor a seizure,
but that interpretation would be particularly problematic in this context. If the data acquisition is
neither a search nor a seizure, the government could presumably collect as much data as desired
without restriction. See Hicks, 480 U.S. 321; Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World,
119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 560–61 (2005). But see ORIN S. KERR, Use Restrictions and the Future of
Surveillance Law, in BROOKINGS INSTITUTION: GOVERNANCE STUDIES 10 (Jeffery Rosen &
Benjamin Wittes eds., 2011) (discussing the difficulty of categorizing all evidence in a collection as
a seizure and imposing use restrictions).
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searches from the overall collection of surveillance, is most accurate and
consistent with precedent in the age of modern technology. As such, under
that approach, ending the analysis by viewing the overall surveillance as
reasonable or by determining that warrants are not be required for foreign
searches abroad, as the FISC has done, would not be enough to satisfy the
Fourth Amendment requirements.
B.

U.S. Person Queries Conducted for Foreign Intelligence Purposes
are Reasonable Fourth Amendment Searches

Because U.S. person queries are Fourth Amendment searches, they
require an independent justification to be constitutional. It does not
necessarily follow, however, that analysts must obtain a warrant prior to
querying a Section 702 database. If the searches fall within an exception
to the warrant requirement or are otherwise reasonable, they may
nonetheless be constitutional.300 Analyzing queries under a general
reasonableness standard, rather than a warrant exception, may more
closely align with the courts’ trajectory of leniency in foreign intelligence
cases and Section 702 particularly—albeit a more stringent analysis than
courts have previously used. Following the generally prevailing Fourth
Amendment standard, though, queries also fall within the foreign
intelligence exception to the warrant requirement.301 Under either
approach, reasonableness will be the touchstone of the constitutionality
analysis.302 U.S. person queries of Section 702 databases conducted for
foreign intelligence purposes will be reasonable given the existing
safeguards, extensive oversight and regulation, and paramount
governmental interests in the data. That said, intelligence analysts must
only conduct U.S. person queries for foreign intelligence purposes, and
queries conducted for criminal investigative purposes should require a
probable cause warrant.

300. See supra notes 170–171 and accompanying text.
301. See, e.g., [Redacted], 2011 WL 10945618 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2011) (searches must
still be reasonable, even where an exception applies); In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004 (Foreign Int.
Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008) (upholding warrantless surveillance under the PAA under the foreign
intelligence exception to the warrant requirement). But see supra note 171 for evidence of the general
reasonableness approach’s relevance in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
302. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967).
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Minimization Procedures and Limited U.S. Person Information
Make U.S. Person Queries Reasonable Searches

The ability to acquire communications is meaningless absent the ability
to access and use such data. Even so, the queries must still be reasonable
to satisfy the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.303 To determine
reasonableness, courts weigh the government’s interests against the
privacy concerns of U.S. persons.304 U.S. person queries will be
reasonable searches if, under the totality of the circumstances, the
government’s legitimate interests outweigh the invasion of privacy.305
Two lines of Fourth Amendment precedent suggest that the use of U.S.
person queries, at least for foreign intelligence, is reasonable government
conduct: (1) minimization and traditional law enforcement cases defining
the reasonableness of searches on the method of their execution, and
(2) recent cases discussing high-volume digital evidence.306 Under both
approaches, queries using U.S. person identifiers constitute reasonable
government action under the totality of the circumstances.
First, precedent indicates that how the government conducts a search is
relevant to its overall reasonableness.307 In the context of U.S. person
queries, the method of executing a search includes minimization and
targeting procedures.308 In Ramirez, the Court acknowledged that a search
may be unreasonable simply because an officer executes a search in an
unnecessarily or excessively destructive manner, even when the search
would otherwise be lawful.309 In other words, the overall reasonableness
303. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
304. See supra Section II.B.
305. Id.
306. See, e.g., Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2494–95 (2014) (requiring a
warrant to access a cell phone’s contents because of the content’s personal and voluminous nature);
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (expressing concern
over personal data that is “aggregated” by the government); United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65,
71 (1998) (determining the reasonableness of a search based on how the law enforcement officer
conducted the search); In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1014–15 (deciding that surveillance is reasonable
based, in part, on the minimization procedures in place).
307. See, e.g., Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 71 (finding that an unreasonable execution of a search inside a
person’s home violated the Fourth Amendment, even though the initial entry into the home was
lawful); In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1012 (applying the totality of the circumstances for Fourth
Amendment reasonableness when analyzing the constitutionality of the Protect America Act (PAA)).
308. Cf. United States v. Mohamud, 843 F.3d 420, 443 (9th Cir. 2016) (declaring that whether the
minimization procedures contained with Section 702 protect privacy interests is an important part of
the reasonableness inquiry); In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1013–15 (looking to the “matrix of
safeguards,” including targeting and minimization procedures, in determining that the PAA was
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
309. Ramirez, 523 U.S. at 71.
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of a search is based not only on what occurs at the outset but on the
execution of the search itself. Under the same reasoning, the FISC has
found Section 702 surveillance to be constitutional based in part on the
minimization procedures.310 These procedures robustly safeguard U.S.
person information and significantly curtail an otherwise invasive
overreach. Minimization procedures reduce the amount of U.S. person
communications incidentally collected, and the government cannot target
a U.S. person for Section 702 surveillance.311 The AG and the FISC
review each agency’s minimization and targeting procedures for
sufficiency and statutory compliance.312
Moreover, minimization procedures related to the queries themselves
are designed to reduce the retrieval of non-pertinent U.S. person
information. The AG approves querying procedures, and agencies must
keep records of each U.S. person identifier used to query Section 702
databases.313 Such oversight is designed to ensure that queries are tailored
to be “reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence information.”314
Analysts are prevented from using overbroad identifiers or using U.S.
person identifiers to search upstream internet communications, and,
generally, they must get approval before using a U.S. person identifier to
query a database.315 Overall reasonableness requires reasonable execution
of a search, and minimization procedures provide the necessary
safeguards to protect U.S. person information.
Second, as a result of the safeguards in place, data retrieved from a U.S.
person query will not be “aggregated” to the degree that has troubled
courts in recent Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.316 At least one scholar
has argued that the aggregated nature of the data places queries within the
scope of the Fourth Amendment.317 In contrast, this Comment contends
that, while the Fourth Amendment regulates queries, the piecemeal
method by which the government collects U.S. person information weighs
310. See FISC 2015, 2015 ODNI 20160415, at *44–45 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2015).
311. See supra Section I.B.1.b.
312. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(e)(2) (2018) (requiring judicial review of agency minimization
procedures); id. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(i) (requiring judicial approval of targeting procedures).
313. 50 U.S.C. § 1873 (requiring the reporting of all applications submitted, orders issued, and
statistics concerning terms identifying “a known United States person” used to retrieve raw data under
Section 702); id. § 1873(b)(2)(D) (reporting requirements for the FBI).
314. NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 13, at 4–5.
315. CHRIS INGLIS & JEFF KOSSEFF, HOOVER INST., IN DEFENSE OF FAA SECTION 702, at 13–14
(2018); PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 57.
316. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 416 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
317. Emily Berman, When Database Queries Are Fourth Amendment Searches, 102 MINN. L. REV.
577, 578–79 (2017).
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in favor of a finding of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. In the realm
of Section 702 surveillance, the numerous safeguards and procedures that
protect U.S. persons’ privacy and the national security interests at stake
are paramount. Any information acquired about any U.S. person will
necessarily be scattered—whereas, only the communications where a U.S.
person is communicating with a foreign target or a U.S. person is
mentioned in a foreign target’s communications will be acquired and
retained in Section 702 databases. At least since the FISC’s ruling in 2011,
the government can no longer acquire MCTs or retain MCTs already
collected where U.S. person information is part of the “transaction.”318
Upon discovering that a single communication within a transaction is “not
to or from a tasked selector,” the entire MCT must be destroyed (and thus
could no longer be retrieved via a query).319 Accordingly, the risk of the
government learning a mosaic of a person’s life through Section 702
acquired data is virtually nonexistent. The data revealed by a U.S. person
query will not track a U.S. person for an extended period of time, like in
Carpenter or Jones, or give the government access to the entirety of a U.S.
person’s emails, call logs, notes, search history, and prescriptions like in
Riley. In short, the government’s intrusion by use of U.S. person queries
is inherently limited.
Importantly, the government interest is also quite significant. Under a
balancing test viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances, the
government’s interest in using U.S. person identifiers to query
Section 702 databases far outweighs the marginal intrusion on privacy.
Courts have defined the national security objectives of Section 702
surveillance as the “highest order of magnitude,”320 and the NSA has
described the surveillance as “irreplaceable.”321 Perhaps the most
important interest is protecting against threats to the homeland—
particularly by using tools like U.S. person queries. Moreover, the IC and
law enforcement community have posited that hundreds of the Western
recruits to terrorist organizations emanate from the United States.322
318. See [Redacted], 2011 WL 10947772, at *9 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2011) (requiring the
NSA to limit acquisitions to communications to or from an authorized 702 target).
319. Id. at *10.
320. In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004, 1012 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008); see also In re Sealed
Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
321. Rebecca Shabad, The Fight Brewing in Congress Over How to Reauthorize a Key Surveillance
Tool, CBS NEWS (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/the-fight-brewing-in-congressover-how-to-reauthorize-a-key-surveillance-tool/ [https://perma.cc/E9SG-TKDQ] (noting that a
senior NSA analyst referred to Section 702 as the “single most important statute the NSA has”).
322. Deborah S. Sills, Strengthen Section 702: A Critical Intelligence Tool Vital to the Protection
of Our Country, 7 NAT’L SECURITY L. BRIEF 1, 2 (2016) (explaining that Section 702 is one of the

13 - Adams.docx (Do Not Delete)

446

3/25/2019 8:40 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 94:401

Former Director of the FBI, Christopher Wray, has explained that queries
give the IC the “agility we need to stay ahead of those threats” and that
any obstacles to doing so will “put the American public at greater risk.”323
Since United States v. Truong Dinh Hung,324 and more recently in cases
like Keith, courts have shown tremendous leniency when national security
interests are at stake.325 Section 702 queries are reasonable under the
Fourth Amendment because the intrusion on the U.S. person’s privacy is
so limited and the government’s interests are so paramount. Under both
lines of cases discussed in this section—the cases defining the method of
execution and the cases discussing the scope of digital searches—queries
are reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Thus, this Comment argues
that minimization procedures effectively protect U.S. persons’ personal
information, and the narrow, limited nature of the government intrusion
weighed against the national security interests involved renders query
searches reasonable. Under a general reasonableness approach to the
Fourth Amendment, this is the end of the constitutionality analysis. Under
the more traditional warrant preference approach, this analysis is still
necessary to render the queries reasonable, but queries must also fall
within a recognized warrant exception.
2.

Most U.S. Person Queries Fall Within the Foreign Intelligence
Exception

U.S. person queries are constitutional as foreign intelligence searches.
While the Court has not squarely recognized the existence of a foreign
intelligence exception to the Warrant Clause, the Court has recognized a
comparable exception where “special needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement

nation’s critical tools to “anticipate and counter” terrorist threats); Peter Bergen, Albert Ford, Alyssa
Sims & David Sterman, Part II. Who are the Terrorists?, NEW AM., https://www.newamerica.org/indepth/terrorism-in-america/who-are-terrorists/ [https://perma.cc/5CMT-STZS] (reporting that “every
jihadist who conducted a lethal attack inside the United States since 9/11 was a citizen or legal
resident”).
323. Christopher Wray, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Remarks at the Heritage Foundation:
Defending the Value of FISA Section 702 (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.fbi.gov/news/
speeches/defending-the-value-of-fisa-section-702 [https://perma.cc/44XN-Q4ZV].
324. 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980).
325. E.g., Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 322 (1972) (requiring a warrant for domestic security surveillance
but recognizing the “different policy and practical considerations” for national security cases and
distinguishing domestic from foreign intelligence); Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 913–15 (using
the Keith analysis to reject a uniform warrant requirement for foreign intelligence surveillance).
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impracticable.”326 In foreign intelligence surveillance, as the FISCR has
recognized, the government’s interests are equally acute and the warrant
requirement may similarly hinder the government’s vital interests.327 The
Court left open the question of whether an exception to the Fourth
Amendment exists permitting the government to conduct foreign
intelligence surveillance in Katz.328 Then, in Keith, the Court strongly
suggested, but left unresolved, that less rigorous requirements are
necessary for foreign intelligence searches in the United States.329 Every
appellate court that has addressed the issue has upheld warrantless
surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes in the United States as an
exception to the warrant requirement.330
In the case of Section 702, the initial intelligence is expressly acquired
for foreign intelligence purposes and must be approved by the FISC prior
to collection.331 As such, data acquired and stored in the 702 databases are
necessarily foreign intelligence related (absent abuse or mistake in
targeting and minimization procedures). To be retained, data that contain
information about identifiable U.S. persons must be related to foreign
intelligence information or include evidence of a crime; otherwise,
agencies must purge it from databases.332 The NSA and FBI run routine
post-collection checks to ensure that targets of collection remain outside
the United States and are likely to continue to return foreign intelligence
information.333 Thus, the government’s databases remain filled with
foreign intelligence focused information. Overall, the purpose of

326. Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483
U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
327. The FISCR has analogized foreign intelligence surveillance to the Court’s recognized special
needs exception. In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008) (noting that “there is
a high degree of probability that requiring a warrant would hinder the government’s ability to collect
time-sensitive information and, thus, would impede the vital national security interests that are at stake”).
328. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358 n.23 (1967) (“Whether safeguards other than prior
authorization by a magistrate would satisfy the Fourth Amendment in a situation involving the
national security is a question not presented by this case.”). Justice White’s concurrence expanded on
the open question: “We should not require the warrant procedure and the magistrate’s judgment if the
President of the United States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has considered the
requirements of national security and authorized electronic surveillance as reasonable.” Id. at 364.
329. See Keith, 407 U.S. at 322.
330. See Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 913; United States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir.
1977); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 605 (3d Cir. 1974); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d
418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973).
331. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2018).
332. FBI MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 16, at 22; NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES,
supra note 13, at 12–13.
333. PCLOB REPORT, supra note 7, at 48.
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Section 702 surveillance goes well “beyond the normal need for law
enforcement” in targeting foreigners abroad to protect national security.334
Even so, that does not necessarily mean that the queries conducted fall
within the exception—currently, U.S. person queries may be conducted
only for foreign intelligence purposes or evidence of a crime.335 Since the
most recent reauthorization, the FBI must obtain a court order before
using U.S. person queries as part of a “predicated criminal investigation”
unrelated to national security.336 While this provision is a start, it does not
go far enough to comport with the Fourth Amendment’s requirements.
The reauthorization only applies to the FBI, open criminal investigations
at the predicated stage of the investigation, and content queries.337
Post-FISA, courts have rejected the idea that the “primary” purpose of
a search must be foreign intelligence for the exception to apply.338
However, in the case of Section 702 queries, the data retrieved by
querying databases with U.S. person identifiers for criminal investigative
purposes is likely to be exactly the type of data for which the government
would ordinarily need a warrant to obtain. Moreover, whether or not the
initial collection is lawful, the U.S. person communications that are
incidentally obtained are not necessarily without Fourth Amendment
protection—particularly where the query is considered a “search” itself.339
Where the interests of the executive are not paramount (e.g., interests
other than preserving our national security), the IC should be required to
obtain warrants prior to using U.S. person identifiers to query Section 702
databases. The reauthorization provision should be extended to cover any
use of U.S. person queries—content or metadata—by the IC for criminal
investigative purposes, not solely queries at the “predicated” stage of an
334. See In re Directives, 551 F.3d 1004, 10–11 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2008) (discussing the
foreign intelligence exception’s applicability to FISA). But see Patrick Walsh, Stepping on (or Over)
the Constitution’s Line: Evaluating FISA Section 702 in a World of Changing ‘Reasonableness’
Under the Fourth Amendment, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y, 741, 789–93 (2015) (suggesting
that the national security exception has narrowed in recent years and does not shield Section 702 from
traditional Fourth Amendment scrutiny).
335. FBI MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES, supra note 16, at 8–9; NSA MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES,
supra note 13, at 4–5; see also supra Section I.B.3.
336. FISA Amendments Reauthorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-118, § 101(f)(2)(A), 132
Stat. 3, 4–5 (2018) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(f)(2)(A) (2018)).
337. See id.
338. See In re Directives, 551 F.3d at 1011; In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 743 (Foreign Int.
Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).
339. See Keith, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); United
States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 285 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he broad and unsuspected governmental
incursions into conversational privacy which electronic surveillance entails necessitate the application
of Fourth Amendment safeguards.” (quoting Keith, 407 U.S at 313).
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open criminal investigation by the FBI. Moreover, the “primary” purpose
language should be retained. To comport with the Fourth Amendment,
U.S. person queries must be conducted only when primarily for foreign
intelligence purposes—which would be a more rigorous requirement than
the “significant purpose” test currently in place.340
Like computer searches that return nonresponsive data, criminal
investigations of U.S. persons are not—and cannot constitutionally be—
the purpose of Section 702 surveillance. In computer searches, courts
often find that nonresponsive information exceeds the scope of a warrant
and cannot be used as evidence in trial or to secure an additional
warrant.341 The relevant computer cases are not entirely consistent with
querying—the searches are initially conducted with warrants and are
concerned with the need for an additional warrant—but they are
instructive. Similarly, a U.S. person query conducted primarily for
criminal investigative purposes is wholly outside the scope of Section 702
surveillance, and for good reason. In other words, the government can
lawfully seize the data and use it for lawfully permitted purposes, but
when the government seeks to broaden its use of the seized data to pursue
a criminal investigation of a U.S. person, it needs a warrant.342 Like a
criminal wiretap, accessing and using U.S. person communications as
evidence of a crime requires a warrant; otherwise, the government may
effectively “bootstrap away an American’s right to privacy by ‘targeting’
the foreign end.”343
For these reasons, U.S. person queries conducted to obtain foreign
intelligence information for national security purposes are constitutional
under the foreign intelligence exception and the reasonableness
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. Statutory limitations address the
skepticism by critics who worry that creating a foreign intelligence
exception (in the context of electronic surveillance) will permit sweeping

340. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 743.
341. United States v. Carey, 172 F.3d 1268, 1272 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that an officer’s search
for child pornography was beyond the scope of the initial warrant for drug sales information and
required a new warrant).
342. Note, however, that I am not suggesting the inclusion of a requirement to purge nonresponsive
data, under the Fourth Amendment or otherwise. There is no reason to expand the Fourth Amendment
to have an element requiring the government destroy non-pertinent evidence after some period,
notwithstanding the statute’s own retention limitations—especially because information not thought
to be useful may later amount to critical foreign intelligence information.
343. Brief of Amici Curiae ACLU and Electronic Frontier Foundation in support of DefendantAppellant and Reversal at 17, United States v. Hasbajrami, No. 15-2684 (2d Cir. Oct. 23, 2017).
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intrusion by the government under the guise of national security.344
Minimization procedures protect U.S. person information and, at least in
this arena, Congress is well-equipped to continue balancing national
security concerns with privacy rights. That said, the government rarely
runs queries for criminal investigative purposes that have no nexus to
foreign intelligence; the FBI reported zero instances of such queries in
2017 and only one in 2016.345 To date, the FBI has not reported any
instances of the government opening a criminal investigation of a U.S.
person based on an acquisition authorized under Section 702.346 These
statistics suggest that the statute itself is working as designed—to protect
U.S. persons’ privacy interests while allowing the government to protect
our national security.
CONCLUSION
Striking a proper balance between privacy and national security is a
zero-sum game. In the transition from traditional FISA to Section 702,
Congress has significantly expanded foreign intelligence surveillance.
This broadened authority closed the pre-9/11 intelligence gap and broke
down the wall between the IC and law enforcement. However, privacy
advocates strongly criticize Section 702, particularly over the use of U.S.
person queries. Nevertheless, U.S. person queries are reasonable searches
that fall into the foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement. Their reasonableness is defined by both how the
queries are conducted, including minimization, and the narrow scope of
U.S. person information revealed by U.S. person queries.
In struggling to adapt applicable precedent in the modern technological
era, courts have acknowledged Congress’s role in addressing electronic
surveillance and have found that statutory limitations have been quite
effective at balancing security with privacy. Value judgements and policy
considerations guide Fourth Amendment decisions. In an era of increasing
cyber threats, national security interests are paramount. The government’s
ability to efficiently and effectively access Section 702 intelligence
“Saves Lives, [and] Protects the Nation and Allies.”347 Any conclusion to

344. See supra Section I.B for a discussion of minimization procedures that mitigate the intrusion
into U.S. person privacy.
345. See OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, supra note 63.
346. Id.
347. CENT. SEC. SERV., NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, “Section 702” Saves Lives, Protects the Nation and
Allies (Dec. 12, 2017), https://www.nsa.gov/News-Features/News-Stories/Article-View/Articl
e/1627009/section-702-saves-lives-protects-the-nation-and-allies/ [https://perma.cc/L2AN-E85D].
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the contrary risks returning surveillance to the pre-9/11 programs lacking
the speed and agility necessary to enhance national security.

